{"id":744,"date":"2019-09-18T15:03:18","date_gmt":"2019-09-18T13:03:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marxistworkersparty.org.za\/?page_id=744"},"modified":"2019-09-18T15:12:28","modified_gmt":"2019-09-18T13:12:28","slug":"chapter-six","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/?page_id=744","title":{"rendered":"Chapter Six"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Africa<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The great European powers which plundered and colonised\nAfrica have left it with the most crippling legacy of poverty and\nunder-development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The complex political developments on the continent are\nbeyond the scope of this document except in the most general terms. What is\nessential as the starting point of any analysis of politics in Africa, however,\nis an understanding of the insuperable barriers in the way of the development\nof these countries in the epoch of monopoly capitalism and imperialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Africa, perhaps more clearly than any other continent,\nprovides the proof of the argument of Marxism that the fate of all the peoples\nof the earth is now inseparably bound together with the progress of the socialist\nrevolution internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We have shown how the immense scale and sophistication of\nthe productive forces of modern industry stand in contradiction to the division\nof the world into separate nation states. Private ownership and the nation\nstate stand as the fundamental barriers to progress even in the giant economies\nof the imperialist powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While recognizing that the nation state no longer plays a\nprogressive role, Marxists have always supported wars of national liberation\nand the setting up of politically independent states, freed from colonial rule.\nThe formation of these states has been progressive because, with the foreign\nruler expelled, a less complicated situation faces the working class and poor\npeasants in the struggle against local rulers, landlords and capitalists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But in giving this\nsupport unconditionally, Marxists systematically combat all illusions in a\n‘national’ solution to the material problems of the working people.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The internationalist approach of Marxism stands in direct\ncontrast to Stalinism, which cultivates false beliefs, not only in a\n‘national-democratic stage’, but in the possibilities of ‘national\ndevelopment’, a ‘national road to socialism’, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At their inception, the new states of the ex-colonial world\nare faced with the complex of contradictions between the world productive\nforces, their own weak productive forces, and the nation state and private\nownership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even mighty India, with double the population of Africa, is\nsuffocated in its development as a result. India’s motor industry has a 60%\nsubsidy through protection against foreign competition\u2014but still sells only 34\n000 cars a year. In 1980, its steel industry was operating at only 68% of\ncapacity\u2014and still steel had to be imported, together with coal and cement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Partial nationalisations prop up many industries which would\nsimply not exist if exposed to the full force of international competition.\nNationalised industries in India hold three-quarters of the country’s\nindustrial assets, and together make a loss!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus the nation state can partly protect local economic\ndevelopment against the pressures of the world market even on the basis of\ncapitalism, but only at the expense of heaping up massive new contradictions.\nFundamentally the nation state is a barrier to the integration of the\nproductive forces internationally, which is possible only with a revolutionary\ntransformation of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even, as we have seen, where private ownership is overthrown\nunder proletarian bonapartist regimes, the national state apparatus is\nentrenched and undergoes a huge parasitic development. The national\nself-interest of each Stalinist bureaucracy drives them even to wars against\neach other (witness the Sino-Soviet split and the border clashes between the\ntwo; the military conflict between Vietnam and China; the war between Vietnam\nand Kampuchea, or that between Ethiopia and Somalia, etc).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is only the movement of the working class, and\nrevolutions bringing the working class to power with conscious Marxist\nprogramme and leadership, which can break down the nation-state barriers, end\nimperialism, and lead to the harmonious integration and development of the\nproductive forces internationally under democratic workers’ control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Africa: Divided and\nPoor<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Africa is a continent of vast resources\u2014of rich mineral\ndeposits, and mighty rivers to serve as sources of energy. Yet, even taken as a\nwhole, its gross annual production is tiny in relation to its resources and the\nneeds of its people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The total value of production in sub-Saharan Africa\n(excluding South Africa) in 1980 was $100 000 million\u2014the equivalent of the\nassets of the Shell and Exxon multi-national oil companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reflects both the crippling legacy of colonial rule and\nthe continued impasse of development on the basis of capitalism. In most of\nAfrica, the imperialists have invested very little. It is estimated that 40% of\nthe total private foreign investment in Africa south of the Sahara between 1880\nand 1936, went to South Africa; 18% to Zambia and Zimbabwe; 15% to Zaire, Kenya\nand Uganda\u2014and only negligible quantities of investment elsewhere. The same\npattern was repeated after World War II\u2014up to 1961 half the new private\ninvestment in Africa went to South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By 1960 there were only about 10 million African wage\nearners (including seasonal labour). But to consider the economy of Africa as a\nwhole does not take into account the full extent of the problem. As a result of\ncolonial rule, Africa has suffered appalling Balkanisation and national\nfragmentation. This forms one of the major barriers to development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Organization of African Unity, established to promote\nAfrican unity, bases itself on maintaining the \u2018territorial integrity\u2019 of\nexisting states. Unable, because of the rottenness of capitalism, to even\ndevelop and unite their own countries, its member-states cannot take a single\nmaterial step towards the unification of Africa. Yet everyone publicly\nrecognizes that African unity is essential if the continent is to progress!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The resulting impotence of the OAU has been repeatedly\ndemonstrated in every real crisis\u2014over the civil war in Nigeria from 1967 to\n1970; over the crisis in Angola in 1975; over Chad in 1981; in their inability\nto unite today to support the people of the Western Sahara led by Polisario\nagainst Moroccan claims to their country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1981, during the Libyan intervention in the civil war in\nChad, the governments of the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Gabon and\nSenegal all actually asked for more French soldiers to garrison their states\nagainst Libya! Niger and Cameroun have also sought defence agreements with the\nFrench.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Increasingly the national leaders grouped in the OAU feel\nthemselves like so many pigeons, waiting to be picked off by coups and\nrevolutions. They huddle together, anxiously trying to curb the quarrels in\ntheir ranks. As though compensating for weakness, they splash out on lavish\nconferences and public displays. The recent OAU conference in Sierra Leone cost\n$130 million\u2014the equivalent of about one-fifth of the country’s gross annual\nproduction! The year before that, in Liberia, it cost $200 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, President Tolbert was assassinated while he\nwas the current Chairman of the OAU. The leader of the Liberian coup,\nmaster-sergeant Samuel Doe, was at first boycotted by a fearful OAU\u2014but then\nadmitted once he seemed fixed in his seat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The unremitting\nturmoil in Africa, and the brittleness of the continent’s ‘nation states’, is\nan expression of economic stagnation and bankruptcy.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When conquered by imperialism, Africa as a whole was at a\nlower level of economic development than other regions of the colonial world.\nWhile there was a significant indigenous trade, the bulk of the population\nlived by direct subsistence from the land. There was little development of a\npeasantry in the sense that it had existed in Europe, or still exists in Asia\nor Latin America. Nor was landlordism much developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Simultaneously, there has been a far lower density of\npopulation in Africa, and hence less pressure on the land.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Conquest<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With colonial conquest, however, capitalist market relations\nbegan to penetrate the traditional societies. Cash-crop agriculture developed,\nshaped by the imperial powers to serve the needs of their economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In certain colonies\u2014such as Kenya and Rhodesia \u2014white\nsettler populations gathered and dominated agricultural production with methods\nof large-scale capitalist farming. In other colonies (such as Ghana and\nSenegal) an indigenous peasantry developed, producing crops no longer for the\nsubsistence of their own communities alone but also for sale on the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This narrow economic basis of colonial capitalism provided\nlittle or no foundation for the domestic accumulation of capital or the\ndevelopment of industry, as had occurred in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus with the partial exception of South Africa (dealt with\nin later chapters), Nigeria and Egypt, African countries have had no\npossibility of developing any significant industrial base able to stand up in\nthe high winds of world capitalist competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Large-scale industry based in the advanced countries\ndominates world markets. Under-development, poverty, and dependence on cheap\nlabour mean that the domestic market in Africa is cripplingly small. The huge\ncost of developing major manufacturing industries is completely out of the\nreach of these countries, and even if they could finance them, they would be\nunable to use their capacity because of the existing pressures of capitalist\n‘over-production’ and stagnation on the world market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Terms of trade<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, manufacturing industry, where it has developed in\nAfrica, has generally involved relatively small-scale production of fairly\nelementary consumer goods. Every step forward in this direction, however, also\ninvolves increasing imports of machinery and other capital goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because of the power of the imperialist monopolies, Africa,\nlike all the ex-colonial world, is subjected to super-exploitation through the\nterms of trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Africa is more exposed than any other part of the world to\nthe vagaries of world trade in primary commodities. Thirty-two ‘major resource\ncommodities’ account for about 70% of its non-fuel exports, compared with 35%\nfor all ‘Third World’ countries, and 10% for the world as a whole. In 1975, at\nleast 20 countries in Africa derived more than half their export earnings from\na single product.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Worsening inequalities in the terms of trade have been\napparent throughout the independence period in Africa. For example, in Senegal,\npeasants got fewer francs for a kilo of peanuts in 1968 than they got in 1960,\nwhile the price of small farm equipment rose more than 250% in the same period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Central African Republic, the official producer price\npaid for cotton doubled in money terms from 1970 to 1978, while the price of\nmanufactured goods trebled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In spite of spiralling inflation, the official prices paid\nto producers remained virtually stagnant in a number of African countries in\nthe 1970s. Between 1978 and 1980, the terms of trade of the non-oil producing\ncountries of Africa fell as a whole by about 8%, and even the World Bank admits\nthat this loss of purchasing power “will probably be permanent”. (A\nfall in raw material prices is a characteristic feature of capitalist crisis.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All this has meant intolerable hardships, especially for the\npoor peasants, who, unable to afford advanced machinery, have to work harder\nand harder to receive less and less. Thus in Zambia, for instance, peasants now\nhave to grow three times as much maize as they did during the 1960s, to buy a\nsimilar shirt, blanket or hoe. Not surprisingly, many peasants do not find it\nworthwhile to produce for the market, and return where possible to producing\nfor their own needs alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result of all\nthese factors, this fertile continent, with its vast potential for agricultural\nproduction, today faces the most severe food crisis in the entire world.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Food Crisis<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Because of the pressures of capitalism on agriculture, with\nthe increasing ruin of production for the market, there has been a steady drift\nof population to the towns. Although not yet on the scale of Asia and Latin\nAmerica, there has been a big growth of shanty towns on the outskirts of the cities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1960 only three cities in Africa south of the Sahara had\npopulations exceeding 500 000. In 1980 there were 28.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kinshasa now has at least three million people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lagos’ population almost doubled between 1975 and 1980\u2014and\ncould reach 20 million by the year 2000. Already the average living space per\nperson is only three square metres, and only half the city’s population has\naccess to clean running water\u2014the rest having to buy it by the bucketful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Together with the increased flow of population from the land\nto the towns, the crisis of peasant agriculture has meant a steady decline in\nfood production per head of population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the continent as a whole, food production per person fell\n7% in the 1960s, declined a further 15% in the 1970s, and is likely to continue\ndeteriorating throughout the 1980s, according to a recent UN World Food Council\nreport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Food consumption is 10% less per head than 10 years ago,\ndespite a doubling of grain imports in the 1970s to 11 million tonnes. Over the\npast few years, Kenya, Zambia, Zaire, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have all\nbeen obliged to import maize from South Africa. The UN report warns that\nAfrica’s total food imports are expected to triple by the mid-1980s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the dry regions of the continent Africa’s food crisis\nmeans appalling famines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the past half-century 650 000 square kilometres of once\nproductive land on the southern edge of the Sahara have been turned into desert.\nThe desert is now advancing by seven to eight kilometres a year. The causes of\nthis are complex, but are substantially economic and social, involving\nover-grazing, destruction of trees, uneconomical methods of cultivation, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the arid regions of the world, one person now dies of\nhunger and malnutrition every six seconds. Many of these are in Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Sahel region, stretching from Senegal to Somalia, at\nleast 150 000 died of famine in 1973 alone. Since then there have been the\nfamines in the Ogaden and in Karamoja.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1980, after crop failures made worse by the turmoil of\nwar, more than 150 million people in 26 African countries were hungry. In the\nSudan today, 10 million people are at risk from starvation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To overcome these problems and reverse them would require\ntruly vast investment, and an economic and social transformation impossible on\nthe basis of capitalism or within the framework of the national state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The crisis of peasant agriculture is made insoluble by the\ncombined effects of neo-colonial domination, the widening gap between\nagricultural prices and the inflated prices of imports, and the weakness of the\ndomestic market and general impoverishment of the population in the towns. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Peasants will only produce food over and above their own\nimmediate needs if they derive some benefit from this\u2014if they can exchange the\nsurplus for manufactured goods, for fertilisers, implements, clothing, radios\nand other products leading to the advancement of their conditions of life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But if the economy cannot provide these things\u2014at least at\nprices the peasants can afford\u2014there is no inducement to increase production.\nIn turn, the stagnation of agriculture fuels the vicious circle of\nunder-development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a number of countries in Africa, as in other continents,\nthe state has attempted to intervene and compel the peasants to increase\nproduction without any corresponding economic inducement. Invariably this leads\nto disaster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Mali, which is effectively under a military dictatorship,\nthe state ‘Office du Niger’ has organised the collective exploitation of the\npeasants, backed up by military force. Fixed quotas are imposed on the peasants\nto sell quantities of food to the state. If the peasants refuse to meet these\nquotas, soldiers come and beat them up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because of the low level of technique, and resulting low\nproductivity of agriculture, the peasants are often left with only enough rice\nto feed themselves and their families for little more than half a year, after\nthe quota of food has been handed over. They quickly discover that the more isolated<\/strong> villages\u2014further from the reach\nof the state\u2014are better off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Subsistence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus there is a tendency for peasants to escape as far as\npossible into subsistence farming or, where they are able to produce a surplus,\nto smuggle it over the border into neighbouring countries where a higher price\ncan be obtained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cereal production has fallen to half the level of the 1950s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unable to solve the crisis by these methods of coercion, the\nregime in Mali resorted to looking for increased foreign aid to promote the\nmechanisation and development of agriculture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as a condition, the aid donors are now imposing a \u2018free\nmarket\u2019 on Mali. By this is meant that price controls on food have to be\nlifted, as a supposed inducement for the peasants to produce freely for the\nmarket.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But how can food prices be raised without threatening the\ntowns? Immediately the impoverished workers and unemployed of the towns are\nfaced with disaster. Without the healthy development of industry and rising\nemployment, there cannot be a development of the domestic market and effective\nexchange of commodities between town and country. The situation lurches from\none contradiction to another, and the vicious circle of dependence and under-development\nis maintained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By one route or another, the regime comes into contradiction\nwith the mass of the population. Temporarily it can balance uneasily,\nmanoeuvring between the peasants and workers, oppressing both while attempting\nto set the one off against the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The regime has also manoeuvred and tacked in foreign relations\nbetween the Soviet Union on the one hand and the imperialist powers (especially\nFrance) on the other. While the working class in Mali is struggling for\nindependent unions against the military dictatorship, the Soviet bureaucracy, vies\nwith France for the sympathy of\u2014the\nregime<\/strong>. The Malian armed forces, which are used to suppress the peasants\nand workers, have been trained by about 200 Soviet advisors and supplied with\nSoviet planes and equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mali alone has the agricultural potential to feed the whole\nof West Africa\u2014but this is impossible unless society is freed from the shackles\nof capitalism and from the contradictions of neo-colonialism and the nation\nstate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It could not be excluded that the regime in Mali could pass\nover, under severe pressure from the masses in a revolutionary crisis, to the\nreconstruction of state power on proletarian bonapartist lines. Already most of\nindustry is nationalised, with state enterprises accounting for about 75% of\nindustrial output.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But even such a turn would not fundamentally change the\nimpasse of backwardness and poverty which the people face. For a small and weak\neconomy, with no possibility of developing an independent industrial base,\nreliance on imported machinery and technology would continue unabated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The creeping paralysis of the economies of the developed\nStalinist states means that there is now less and less possibility for their\nunder-developed allies to gain the necessary assistance there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The desperate search for increased aid from the West is one\nof the factors which has produced, for example, the recent turn by Sekou\nToure’s officially ‘Marxist’ Guinea from a close relation with the Soviet\nbureaucracy toward a new alignment with imperialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Zero Growth<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

On a continental scale in Africa there is now a generalised\ncrisis of agriculture and industry, reflected in social and political stresses\nand storms. Even the bald statistics of growth demonstrate the depth of the\nimpasse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the 1970s, output per person rose more slowly in\nsub-Saharan Africa than in any other part of the world. Death rates are the\nhighest in the world and life expectancy the lowest. Of the world’s 31\ncountries with an income of less than $200 per head, 21 are African.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 19 African countries per capita income grew by less than\n1% a year between 1969 and 1979, and 15 countries recorded negative growth. In\nthe whole of the 1980s Africa is expected to show zero growth!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are the devastating consequences of the international\ncrisis of capitalism in this, the least developed part of the capitalist world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the continent falls further and further behind the\ndeveloped industrial powers, as the value of exports falls or stagnates, one\nAfrican government after another is obliged to cut back on its already\ninadequate development plans. It becomes less and less possible to afford the\ncost of the necessary imports of industrial goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already, on average, the foreign currency reserves of the\nstates in Africa are sufficient only to cover about two months of imports. At\nthe mercy of world market forces manipulated by the monopolies, any African\ncountry can be precipitated into the severest crisis by a sudden fall in the\nprice of its main export product.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, any breakdown in the transport network, the\nchoking up of the ports, etc., can leave these countries within a matter of\nweeks unable to maintain their exports and thus unable to pay for current\nsupplies of vital imports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Loans<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Occasionally, small rescue operations by the international\nbankers, covering deficits with foreign loans, may enable bankrupted African\ngovernments to stagger from one crisis to the next. But Africa provides the\nleast attractive prospect of anywhere to the international money sharks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bankers of the West have already burned their fingers\nbadly in the case of Zaire. This country, once talked of as the “Brazil of\nAfrica”, has a quarter of the world’s copper, half the world’s cobalt, and\nvast diamond and other mineral resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the basis of rising world copper prices in 1973-4,\nhundreds of millions of dollars were borrowed from the West to finance\ndevelopment. When the oil price quadrupled, the price of copper slumped and the\neconomy was shattered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By June 1975, Zaire was unable to pay the interest on its\nloans. The banks agreed to reschedule the debt, but still received no interest.\nA special IMF task force was sent in, but withdrew again without result. Then\nthe World Bank sent a mission under a Dutch economist, also without result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now the banks accept that they will not get back their $4,5\nbillion loaned to Zaire!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But what can they do about it? As the American magazine Newsweek<\/em> expressed it, the concept of\nbankruptcy has no real meaning for a nation, for it is no longer possible to\nsend an imperial gunboat up the river to seize a nation’s assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is irony indeed that the rapacious bankers are now\nbecoming ‘victims’ of their own imperialist world crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the present system the working people of Zaire face a\nlosing battle even for their daily bread. They carry on their backs the\nimpossible burdens of neo-colonial domination, combined with the exploitation\nof local capital and the vicious oppression of a corrupt military regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Mobutu government has given Kinshasa the reputation of\nthe ‘corruption capital’ of Africa. He has personally siphoned hundreds of\nmillions of dollars of Western loans and aid into personal bank accounts in\nEurope. His possessions include blocks of flats, stately homes and land in\nBelgium, Switzerland, France, Spain and elsewhere in Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Mobutu’s crimes merely epitomise a condition which\nsaturates the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is simmering hostility to the regime throughout Zaire,\nand it can only maintain its grip by the most ruthless measures. When, in 1978,\nthere was a popularly supported armed rebellion in the mineral-rich Shaba\nprovince, Mobutu was only able to re-establish his grip with the aid of French\nparatroopers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If corruption has reached unparalleled proportions in Zaire,\nit is none the less endemic in all the capitalist regimes of Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is inevitable because, in the stagnation of their\neconomies, the ruling bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elites have no possibility\nof advancing their position and enriching themselves by the ‘normal’ methods of\ncapitalist exploitation. They are in the position of scavengers who must\ncontent themselves with the leavings where the great lions of capitalism have\nalready fed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus it is through the apparatus of the state that they seek\nto enrich themselves\u2014by bribery, pilfering and the taking of kick-backs on the\nside. Corruption seeps down through the whole state bureaucracy, affecting and\nperverting even the smallest official function.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Dictatorship<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In these countries, the character of the state reflects the\neconomic impasse, the weakness of the capitalist class, and the simmering\ndiscontent of the mass of the people. Within years of political independence,\nmost of the impotent ‘parliaments’ constructed by the colonial powers on the\nmodel of London or Paris were swept aside. Many of the leaders of the independence\nmovements became personal dictators, ruling through the machinery of one-party\nstates, or were displaced by military coups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus the unresolved crisis of society and the contradictions\nbetween the contending classes has given rise (as elsewhere in the ‘Third\nWorld’) to bonapartist regimes, rising above the pressures of the classes in\nconflict and balancing between them, always in the interests of the survival of\ncapitalism. The state apparatus has grown overweight and top-heavy, absorbing\nhuge proportions of the national product just in the payment of salaries to the\nbureaucrats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The new burdens imposed by the world capitalist downswing\nheighten the tensions immeasurably. Coups and counter-coups, a veering between\nmilitary and civilian rule, take place at an accelerated pace. In some\ncountries, such as Uganda and Chad, the unresolved centrifugal tensions of\nnational fragmentation crack the state machinery itself apart into near total\nbreakdown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any country in Africa could be taken to illustrate the\nimpasse of economy and society facing the entire continent as a result of the\ndelays of the world socialist revolution. Here we have space for only a few\nexamples, each of which, in its own way, is significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

‘Socialism’ in\nTanzania?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Since the 1960s, many in Africa have looked to the example\nof ‘Tanzanian socialism’ in the hope of finding there an alternative, both to\nthe exploitation of capitalism and to the totalitarian system of Stalinism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, no revolutionary transformation of society,\ninvolving the abolition of the capitalist system, has taken place in Tanzania.\nWhile attempts have been made by the Nyerere government to improve the conditions\nof the working people, the experience of Tanzania over the past twenty years\nhas rather gone to show the complete impossibility of establishing stable\nreform in an under-developed country\u2014irrespective of the intentions of the\nleaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ideas of ‘African socialism’ have been based on the\nbelief that the pre-capitalist rural communities of Africa could serve as the\nfoundation and model for the development of society on lines of democracy and\nequality, avoiding the emergence of class divisions, of class struggle, and\nclass rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such ideas have proved to be completely utopian. They ignore\nthe fact (which Marx long ago explained) that the very development of the\nproductive forces\u2014the basis of all progress\u2014itself inevitably liquidates the\nold communal societies and provides the material foundation for class\nstratification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The transition to socialism is possible only in conditions\nof abundance arising from the highest development of the productive forces,\nmodern industry and technique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those conditions are\npresent on a world scale. <\/strong>Because of the international nature and scale of\nmodern productive forces, it is impossible for national economies to develop\nfar in isolation or to find their own ‘national’ road to socialism (however\nlong they might strive to do so). The case of Tanzania shows conclusively that\nthe struggle for socialism in Africa cannot be separated from the struggle for\nsocialism world-wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in Africa. With a\npopulation of 18 million, about 90% are peasants while (in 1975) the number of\nworkers in industry amounted to only 72 000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At independence in 1961 there were very few industries, and\nthese were mainly foreign-owned and under foreign management, largely concerned\nwith the processing of agricultural products. There was no local bourgeoisie to\nspeak of except a small Asian merchant class. The African middle-class could\ngain a foothold only through control of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also under pressure to improve the conditions of the people,\nNyerere’s government moved in the late 1960s to bring most of the economy under\nstate control. But industrial growth, starting from a very low base, has inevitably\ninvolved increasing dependence on imported industrial goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foreign investment has been negligible, while the surplus\ngenerated domestically has been far too small to sustain the development\nprogramme. Thus an increasing proportion of the development budget has had to\nbe financed from foreign aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From a low point of 24% in 1967\/8, this proportion had risen\nto 68% by the end of the 1970s. Tanzania’s foreign trade is overwhelmingly with\nthe West, and only in marginal quantities with China, Russia and Eastern\nEurope.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Africanised<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After independence, the state bureaucracy was Africanised\nwhile its control was extended over production and distribution. On the one\nhand this cut across the hoarding and over-pricing of the merchant class, but\non the other hand substituted for it the inevitable stifling effects and corruption\ngenerated by bureaucracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Growing quantities of the surplus generated in the economy\ngo to provide salaries and perks for the higher rungs of state employees. The\nmiddle and upper rungs of the civil service have expanded in number from 4 452\nposts at the end of 1961 to well over 20 000 by 1980.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The evils of bureaucracy have become superimposed on the\nevils of under-developed capitalism. Because of the small surplus and extreme\npoverty of the population, the regime has had to constrain the self-enrichment\nand conspicuous consumption of the bureaucrats. This has been taken, especially\noutside Tanzania, to support the regime’s claim to ‘socialism’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the conditions faced by the workers and peasants of\nTanzania result in growing cynicism towards such claims. There is widespread\nsmuggling and cheating, and an elaborate magendo<\/em>\n(black market) system involving large numbers of officials operates at the expense\nof the poor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shortages of food have become acute, especially inland,\nwhere mealiemeal, soap, cooking oil, sugar and paraffin often sell for three\ntimes the official price, if available at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an effort to increase peasant production, while bringing\nit under state control, the regime launched the ujamaa<\/em> programme, and later, \u2018villagisation\u2019 on a national scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, for the peasants there is no advantage in collectivising\nproduction unless there is a return for increased output in the form of a\nsupply of manufactured goods and services. Without a material basis to support\nthem, purely ‘moral’ incentives prove impotent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unable to gain the support of the peasants for voluntary\nvillagisation, the regime carried this out by force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Certainly, as a result, the peasants gained advantages of\nwater supply, schools and health services. 48% of the 8 000 villages have\nwater; 92% have primary schools; and 35% have medical dispensaries. Adult\nliteracy has risen from about 10% (in 1960) to more than 73%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But beyond that there has been little advantage for the\npeasants, and living standards in rural areas are now in decline. Compulsory quotas have to be imposed on the\nvillages for communal production. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not surprisingly, the peasants stubbornly resist this, and\nthere has been hardly any progress beyond subsistence farming. Only about 20\nvillages are said to be truly communal. At least 95% of the agricultural land\nis still farmed on an individual basis. Without ploughs, the peasants still\ndepend on the hoe\u2014a symbol of under-development which is actually made an\nobject of glorification by the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cashew production fell by a half during the 1970s, while\ncoffee production also fell. By the end of the decade, Tanzania’s exports of\ntea, coffee, cotton, and sisal had dropped to the level of 1962.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, the real value of peasant production was\neroded by the adverse terms of trade on the world market. By 1979, for example,\nit required 13 tonnes of tea for Tanzania to import a tractor, compared with 5\ntonnes in 1972. This was experienced by the peasants as a dwindling in real\nterms of the official state-imposed prices for their crops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The swollen bureaucracy has become an enormous drain on the\neconomy. In the case of cashew nuts, more is spent on the administration of the\nproduct than on producing it. And it is now costing Tanzania more in administration costs<\/strong> to produce a kilo\nof pyrethrum than the world market price for the product!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The large standing army of 35 000 adds to the drain on the\neconomy, which became severe during the military intervention in Uganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such is the parlous state of the economy that in June 1981\nTanzania’s foreign reserves covered only two days’ imports. Arrears in payments\nto foreign suppliers stretched back 24 months. With industry operating at only\n30% of capacity, inflation was running at 30-40%, real wages of the workers had\nfallen 40% in a decade, and the government was trying to reach agreement with\nthe IMF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, in March 1982, President Nyerere has announced the\nsuspension of all development projects proposed for the next year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He said that policies during the 1982-3 fiscal year would be\naimed at “consolidating and rehabilitating existing projects”. The\nlittle foreign currency the country would earn next year would be used to pay for\nparts and other essentials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Utopian<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet it was only recently that the regime announced a\n“twenty-year industrialisation programme” giving priority to heavy\nindustry, intended as a basis for the manufacture of machine tools, plant and\nother capital goods! This utterly utopian programme has now ended in the swamp\nof the impossible contradictions of under-development and the international\ncapitalist system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Neither Nyerere nor the Tanzanian ‘socialist’ bureaucracy\ncan find a way out of these contradictions. A way forward will be found only if\nthe small but militant Tanzanian working class can rise to the task of leading\nthe nation, drawing to itself the radical youth and peasants, and striving to\nlink up its struggle and the fate of Tanzania with the development of the\nworking-class movement throughout Africa and internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To succeed in that difficult task, it will be necessary to\ntake up the scientific ideas of Marxism and internationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The period ahead will be one of great turbulence and\nconflict in Tanzania, made all the harsher by the one-party dictatorship which\nthe regime of Nyerere has imposed. The ruling party, the CCM (the successor to\nTANU) is not, as is claimed, an authentic party of workers and peasants but an\ninstrument of the bureaucracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Independent trade unions have been suppressed in Tanzania\nand worker organisation brought under state control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The National Assembly is regarded as a talking shop, with\nmany of its members appointed. Power is in the hands of the CCM, but within the\nparty itself only one-sixth of the NEC are elected by the National Conference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Central Committee is even less a representative body.\nMost real decisions are made by Nyerere himself, together with his close\nadvisers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nyerere skilfully balances and manoeuvres at the head of the\nregime, playing off rivals against each other. While maintaining a personal\nreputation for incorruptibility, he makes his subordinates scapegoats for the\npervasive corruption of the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But in the crisis which Tanzanian society now faces, it may\nwell be that Nyerere’s traditional methods of bonapartist rule will prove\ninadequate, and that there may be a turn towards involvement of the military in\ngovernment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Nigeria Moving into Crisis<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In contrast with Tanzania, Nigeria is the strongest and most\ndeveloped capitalist country in Africa north of the Limpopo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With a population variously estimated at between 80 million\nand 100 million, Nigeria is a giant of Africa. One in every four Africans is\nNigerian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, it is the only country on the continent where, on\nthe basis of a significant growth of industry, there has been a substantial\ndevelopment of an African bourgeois class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The basis for this in Nigeria’s case has been its oil\nwealth. At independence in 1960, oil provided only 2,6% of the country’s export\nearnings. But today oil accounts for well over 90% of export earnings and 80%\nof all government revenues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nigeria is also one of the few countries in Africa having a\nwell-developed small peasantry, with a long history of providing a variety of\nproducts for the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless this vast and populous country has been plagued\nsince independence by serious problems of national division and fragmentation.\nThere are over 250 different language groups, as well as significant economic\nand social differences between the various regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After independence, the still weak national bourgeoisie\nproved incapable of holding the country together, just as it could not satisfy\nthe demands of the peasants and workers. The opening up of Nigeria’s oil\nresources at first merely exacerbated regional rivalries among the elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, after six years of unstable parliamentary government,\nthere was a military takeover, designed to suppress the struggles of the masses\nand impose a semblance of ‘national unity’ on the bourgeoisie, while capitalist\ndevelopment was undertaken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, civil war broke out between the regions, and\nraged for more than three years, inflicting ghastly suffering on wide sections\nof the people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was only in 1979, after thirteen years of military rule\ninvolving no fewer than four coups, that there was a precarious return to\ncivilian government and the holding of elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Changeover<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This changeover was forced by the growing unpopularity of\nmilitary rule, by mass hostility to the corruption of the army officer corps,\nand by a rising movement of the working class against the military’s policy of “wage\nrestraint” which had caused substantial cuts in living standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a capitalist basis it has been impossible to develop\neither agriculture or industry in correspondence with the vast potential of the\ncountry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assisted by state policy, and on the basis of the oil boom\nin the 1970s, it was possible to undertake a programme of Nigerianisation or\n“indigenisation” of industry. Thus whereas in 1966 Nigerians owned\nonly 7% of private sector capital, by 1976 they owned about 42%. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But this development of the national bourgeoisie has taken\nplace mainly in the realm of the production of light and intermediate goods,\nmostly consumer goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nigerian industry has remained characterised by its heavy\ndependence on imported heavy industrial goods, and even materials. While the\nbook value of foreign investment in Nigeria has trebled, manufacturing as a\npercentage of domestic product has stayed stubbornly below 10%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The huge potential market of the Nigerian population has not\nsufficed to ensure an all-round industrial development. The dependence of\ncapitalism on cheap labour squeezes the market, with the result that special\nassistance from the state is necessary to promote the domestic manufacture of\neven nails, concrete blocks and lead pencils. In 1980, only 10% of yarn for the\ntextile industry was produced locally, although the country could be an exporter\nof cotton-based products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most Nigerians are actually worse off after the period of\ngrowth based on the oil boom. The country is characterised by huge disparities\nof wealth. In the towns, about 85% of the population live in extreme poverty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capitalism in Nigeria, unable to promote a healthy development\nof the domestic market, has thereby also been unable to develop agriculture.\nAgricultural production has been falling well behind population growth for over\ntwenty years. From being self-sufficient in food, Nigeria now has to import\nsubstantial quantities of it\u2014to the extent of 15% of total imports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Measures of compulsion directed towards the peasantry, price\ncontrols on agricultural products, etc., have resulted in much of Nigeria’s\ngroundnut crop being smuggled into Niger. Cocoa is smuggled to Benin, where it\nis exchanged for cheaper textiles. In town and country, the ‘parallel market’\nhas burgeoned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To escape crisis, the capitalist class must always seek to\ndevelop the productive forces further, but the contradiction of the system is\nthat each successive development reproduces the crisis on a higher level. The\nvery progress of the Nigerian capitalist economy has made its dependence on oil\nabsolute. Without oil, it would have been impossible to finance imports; nor\ncould the country have afforded the high rate of government spending, which has\nbeen running at about 30% of GDP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless oil is a wasting resource. Realising this, the\nNigerian bourgeoisie embarked on a strategy to broaden their export base by\n1990. Hence the shakily-based government of Shagari launched an extremely\nambitious $125 billion five-year development plan. The aim has been to enable\nNigeria to compete for export markets with the advanced capitalist countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But already the world crisis of capitalism has manifested\nitself as a savage crisis of Nigerian capitalism also. The recession in the\nindustrialised countries of the West (not least in the USA which has been\nbuying half Nigeria’s oil) has produced a slump in the oil market. Not only has\nthe price of oil been forced down once again, but the volume of exports has\nbeen cut.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The development plan budgeted for exports of 1,9 million\nbarrels a day\u2014but in August 1981, with its oil price cut by $4 a barrel,\nNigeria was exporting only 650 thousand barrels a day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Investment plans had to be drastically cut. Imports exceeded\nexports by an average of $650 million a month. In the course of the year,\ntwo-thirds of Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves drained away. Shortages\nbecame widespread and government revenues dried up. At one point the state was\nunable even to pay the wage packets of the civil servants and was faced with a\nrash of strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, in March 1982, with a further fall in oil prices, and a\nrenewed decline in oil exports, the Nigerian government has announced a total\nfreeze on imports. That represents a crisis of major proportions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In all probability, if food imports are not resumed,\ndomestic food prices will have to rise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With one million job seekers coming onto the labour market\neach year, unemployment will rocket faster than ever. It will be more and more\ndifficult for the state to finance the army\u2014the biggest in sub-Saharan Africa,\nwhich has been used in the past as a kind of ‘social sponge’ to keep the\nunemployed off the streets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already there have been big struggles of the working class\nfor a national minimum wage, with the unions demanding double the level of\nwages which the government has been willing to fix. Now these struggles are\ncertain to intensify.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the size of the army has been cut since the civil war,\nthe police force is being vastly expanded, from 80 000 (in 1960) to an expected\n220 000 by 1984. While presented as a measure to combat rising crime, these\nforces are being prepared for confrontations with the working class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time there will be new pressures towards\nnational fragmentation. The present constitution, in an attempt to keep Nigeria\ntogether, allows a considerable flexibility in the creation of new states\nwithin the federation. But already there are sixty-one different demands for\nthe creation of new states!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If not immediately, then certainly in the course of the next\nfew years the parliamentary regime in Nigeria will be rocked by unmanageable\ncrises, and there could well be a new turn to a military or military-police\ndictatorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Explosive<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as in the past that would not solve any of the social or\neconomic problems, and would only heap up further explosive material within\nsociety and the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nigeria has no way out on a capitalist basis. At the same\ntime it is extremely unlikely that there could be a development in the direction\nof proletarian bonapartism. Because of the extent of development of industry,\nthe growth of the bourgeoisie and the size of the petty bourgeoisie adhering to\nit, it would require thorough-going revolution in order to transform Nigeria.\nThe weight of the working class in society means that it is the only social\nforce which could lead that struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The organised labour movement in Nigeria is over thirty\nyears old. The trade unions claim more than three million members. There is a\nlong history of independent workers’ struggle both against military and\ncivilian regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fear of the ruling class for the workers’ movement is\nindicated in the fact that the party-political system is carefully made the\nexclusive preserve of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. The unions are formally\nforbidden by law from participation in party politics\u2014a measure designed to\nprevent the formation of a workers’ party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This situation means that any bourgeois government\u2014military\nor civilian\u2014would be on very shaky foundations in Nigeria. The working class,\norganised on a Marxist programme in a struggle for power, could readily win\nover the bulk of the ranks of the army to the tasks of the revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore the crisis of Nigerian society, in much the same\nway as in the more industrialised countries of capitalism, will come to turn in\nthe years ahead upon a struggle within the organised workers’ movement for a\nrevolutionary programme and leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Which Way Ghana?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Likewise in nearby Ghana, the working class has the capacity\nto lead the peasants, the radical youth and middle class, the lower ranks of\nthe army and the unemployed towards a solution of the nation’s problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana is today in the midst of a revolutionary upheaval. But\nthat revolution is presently in a blind alley, as a result of the lack of a\nclear revolutionary programme and leadership of the mass movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana provided the spear-head of the struggle for independence\nin Africa. Following the withdrawal of British colonialism, the Ghanaian\nworking people have experienced a succession of leaders, policies and regimes.\nThey passed through a series of zig-zags under the government of Nkrumah; they\nhave experienced civilian governments, right-wing military coups and \u2018left-wing\u2019\nmilitary coups; they have experienced programmes of reform followed by\nprogrammes of counter-reform. They have seen promises made, promises broken,\nand promises followed by new promises. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twenty-five years after independence, the Ghanaian economy\nis in tatters, while per capita income is lower in real terms than twenty years\nago. In a country where 10% of the people have 80% of the wealth, the living\nstandards of the workers and poor peasants have fallen savagely. This has been\ndespite the growth of industry from around 2% of GDP in 1958 to around 17% by\n1980. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the familiar pattern of the under-developed countries,\ncapitalism in Ghana has been able to develop in the main only consumer-oriented\nlight industries. Industry has remained heavily\u2014and increasingly\u2014dependent on\nimports. 70-80% of Ghana’s foreign earnings have come from the export of cocoa.\nIn the past the production of cocoa rose steeply\u2014but for whole periods even\nthis did not compensate for the instability and real falls in the cocoa price.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Then the general impasse of the capitalist economy began to\nmanifest itself in the crisis of agriculture. Owing to the lack of investment,\nthere was little new planting and Ghana’s cocoa has come increasingly from ageing\ntrees with a resulting decline in quality and quantity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the course of the last decade, an absolute fall in\nproduction has combined with other factors to precipitate a severe crisis\nthroughout the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1975, 397 000 tonnes of cocoa were produced; in 1981,\nonly an estimated 270 000 tonnes. The transport infrastructure broke down, and\nresulted in an accumulation of cocoa in country areas where it rotted because\nof inadequate storage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bankruptcy of Ghanaian capitalism has also been\nreflected in a crisis of the currency. In 1981, while there was an official\nexchange rate of 6,5 cedis to the pound, they were exchanging on the ‘black\nmarket’ at the rate of 50-55 to the pound sterling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All these factors combined to produce a huge increase in the\nsmuggling abroad of cocoa and other products. Cocoa could be sold in foreign\ncurrency across the border, and then converted to cedis at the unofficial rate.\nAttempts to force the peasants to sell their cocoa at low official prices, on\nan officially controlled market, has long produced chronic smuggling,\nparticularly in the outlying areas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent years the amount of cocoa by-passing the official\nmarket has been estimated at 40-50 000 tonnes a year. By 1980, that amounted to\na loss in foreign exchange equivalent to 15% of the total import bill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Simultaneously, food production has been in absolute\ndecline. It decreased 21% between 1970 and 1978, while Ghana’s population grew\n30% per annum. Young people have been leaving the rural areas and flooding to\nthe towns; because of transport breakdowns fertiliser cannot be transported to\nthe farmers; much of rural trade has been reduced to barter; and there has been\na persistent breakdown of essential supplies to the towns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Urban poverty, rising unemployment, low wages, the\nstagnation of the domestic market, and chronic shortages of foreign exchange\nmeant that\u2014by 1981\u2014most of Ghana’s industry, apart from brewing and\ncigarette-making, was running at only 20-30% of capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were sharp increases in malnutrition, disease and\nchild mortality. Hospitals lacked essential drugs, bandages and sometimes even\nwater. Roads and bridges were in a state of collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With 70% inflation in 1981, the minimum daily wage of a\nworker could buy little over half a loaf of bread. Many have been reduced to\nbuying ‘edible cowhide’ instead of meat. Little wonder that the Ghanaian\nworkers refer to their own survival as “the Ghanaian miracle”!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of these unbearable conditions was piled the\nprofiteering of the Ghanaian merchants and capitalists, and the gross pilfering\nand self-enrichment of the upper layers of the government bureaucracy.\nCorruption, oozing from every crevice of the state, was said to be as rife as\nin Zaire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the early 1960s, the radical government of Nkrumah had\nattempted to secure and elevate the position of the Ghanaian petty-bourgeoisie\nthrough state controls against the depredations of imperialism. While taking\nmeasures to control the working-class, Nkrumah had also been obliged, under\nintense pressure from below, to concede reforms. But on the basis of\ncapitalism, the masses repeatedly lost as much as they gained. Popular support\nfor Nkrumah waned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Coup<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time the imperialists, fearing that Nkrumah\nmight move towards the overthrow of capitalism, financed through the CIA the\nofficers’ coup in 1966. Such was the disillusionment of the masses at that time\nin Nkrumah, that there was no popular movement in opposition to his overthrow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the worsening conditions and oppression of the masses\nduring more than a decade of right-wing civilian and military governments have\nmade the days of Nkrumah appear in retrospect as a golden age. The crisis in\nsociety, the economic decay, the worsening poverty of the people and rampant\ncorruption among the elite, set in motion also splits and upheavals within the\narmy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lower ranks of the army have very poor conditions and\nlive in close contact with the workers and peasants from whom they are drawn.\nIncreasingly also the lower officers have been affected by the ferment in society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This provided the background for the coup in 1979, when\nFlight-Lieutenant Rawlings briefly took power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buoyed up by popular enthusiasm and the support of the lower\nranks of the army, he nevertheless had no idea of how to proceed to resolve the\ncrisis of, Ghanaian society. His programme was confined to an attack on\ncorruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the days after the coup three former military heads of\nstate were executed, and traders accused of profiteering were publicly flogged.\nBut not knowing what to do with power, Rawlings surrendered it again to the\ncapitalist class, with the army under its old commanding stratum, and was himself\nsent into compulsory retirement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In subsequent interviews, Rawlings made it clear that he had\nheaded the coup to open a safety valve for the releasing of popular resentment,\nin order to forestall a full-scale revolutionary mass movement which could have\nled to the disintegration of the army and the over-throw of the Ghanaian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The capitalist government of President Limann, elected in\n1979, pledged itself to eliminate corruption, while turning to policies of\neconomic austerity in an attempt to restore the health of capitalism and\nsatisfy the IMF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From this resulted worsening conditions for the poor, while\nall the old evils of corruption, profiteering, etc., returned with a vengeance.\nRawlings’s earlier attempt to “teach a lesson” to the ruling class\nhad failed. Capitalism requires not lessons but overthrow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fragile basis of capitalism and of the state machinery\nin Ghana was demonstrated again in 1981, by the coup which brought Rawlings out\nof retirement and to power once more. The background to it was the rising mood\nof popular anger, including the threat of a national strike by the working\nclass over the cost of living. The coup itself was almost unplanned, met no\nreal opposition, and was virtually bloodless. It was a pushover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Transformation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For their part the Ghanaian elite are desperately hoping\nthat Rawlings will once again stop short of decisive measures against\ncapitalism. On the other hand, the mass of the people are looking for a real\nrevolutionary transformation of society as the only solution to their problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rawlings balances uneasily between these conflicting\npressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once again he does not know what to do with power. His\nmodest life-style and resolute hostility to corruption gives him an enormous\npersonal following in Ghana. But “anti-corruption” is not in itself a\nrevolutionary programme, as has already been shown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nor do the vague radical ideas and anti-imperialist phrases\nof \u2018Nkrumahism\u2019 show a concrete way forward. To counter the power of the\nright-wing, the senior military officers and top civil servants, Rawlings has\ncalled for the formation of “people’s democratic committees” in\nindustry, the army, and on the land. But unless real power over the day-to-day\nrunning of society is exercised by these committees\u2014linked together\ndemocratically on a country-wide basis\u2014they cannot provide an effective\nalternative to the capitalist state machine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the time being, because of the weakness of the forces of\nreaction, and the weakness of the organised forces of Marxism within the\nGhanaian working-class, this precarious balance of class forces can continue.\nRawlings has composed his first government roughly equally of pro-capitalist\nand anti-capitalist elements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Ghana will inevitably sink deeper and deeper into\neconomic disintegration unless society is transformed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the working-class does not resolve the situation by\ntaking power, then with the cooling and disillusionment of the movement there\nwill probably be a reconsolidation of the state apparatus and a renewed\ndevelopment towards the right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, it will be very difficult for the ruling-class\nand the higher ranks of the army to organise a savage reaction because they are\nalready so thoroughly discredited and loathed as a result of their record of\nthe past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also inherent in the situation that the pressure of\nthe masses may force Rawlings far further to the left than he intends to go,\ninto measures against capitalism and the power of the old elite. Since 1979,\nthe bourgeoisie internationally has been haunted by the spectre of an ‘Ethiopian’\ndevelopment in Ghana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Ethiopian Revolution<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In Ethiopia, in 1974, the famine brought about under the\nrule of the emperor, Haile Selassie and the landlord nobility was the last\ncatastrophe even the officer class was prepared to tolerate. The callous\nindifference of the emperor and the landlord class to the death from starvation\nof hundreds of thousands, together with the accumulated social contradictions\nin a backward country under the pressure of imperialism, pushed the middle\nlayer of the officer caste to organise a coup.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This in its turn awakened the movement of the small working\nclass in Addis Ababa and the students and petty bourgeois layers in the capital\nand the towns. It awakened the peasantry also into a huge movement to take\ncontrol of the land from the landlords.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the face of this, the thousand-year-old empire and its\nclass structure crumbled into dust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The crisis in the army and the attempts at counter-revolution\nfrom above, acted as a spur on the revolution. The movement of the classes and\nthe revolutionary turmoil in Ethiopia in its turn had its effect on the new\nruling junta in the army. It produced splits and conspiracies of officers,\nreflecting the classes in battle and the developing civil war in the whole\ncountry. There could be no going back to the old order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capitalism and landlordism presented no future whatever to\nthe mass of the population or even to the officer caste themselves. Before them\nthey had the example of Russian ‘socialism’, a system offering them the\nelevated position of a military-bureaucratic elite. Conflicts and splits in\ntheir ranks, resulting in repeated purges and executions, soon ended in the\nvictory of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu, a former senior officer of the emperor.\nUnder the pressures of the masses he went all the way, declared himself a\n“Marxist-Leninist” and set about creating a one-party totalitarian\ndictatorship in the image of Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Ethiopian revolution opened the way to land reform and\nother major advances. At the same time the Dergue (Mengistu’s regime) has been\nincapable of resolving Ethiopia’s festering national conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Haile Selassie’s empire had been built on the brutal\noppression of numerous national and tribal minorities. The\n“Marxist-Leninist” Dergue, far from recognising the right of the\nnational minorities to self-determination, has continued their subjugation. The\nshameful war against the Eritrean freedom struggle, commenced by Haile Selassie\n20 years ago, is being fought unabated by the new regime in Addis Ababa. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also in the Ogaden region, in what began as an attempt to\ncrush the guerrilla struggles of the Somali minority, the regime was drawn into\nwar against the neighbouring state of Somalia\u2014a proletarian bonapartist regime\nsimilar to that in Addis Ababa itself. (As a result, the Somali regime has turned\nto imperialism for support.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is worthy of note that the Russian bureaucracy, after\nsupporting both the Somalian regime and the Eritreans against Haile Selassie,\nhave simply switched their support to the Ethiopian regime. From the point of\nview of Soviet foreign policy, Ethiopia is the most important state in the\nregion\u2014an ally for which it is apparently well worth sacrificing Somalia as\nwell as the Eritrean people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The imperialists were unable to intervene directly to crush\nthe Ethiopian revolution by military means and could only grind their teeth in\nimpotence, as the workers and peasants were organised and armed to carry\nthrough the revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Differences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of Ghana, while developments broadly similar to\nthose of the Ethiopian revolution are possible, there are also differences which\ntend to weigh against it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The peasantry does not confront a landlord class as in\nEthiopia. The forces of counter-revolution, which were entrenched in Ethiopia,\nare presently pathetically feeble in Ghana\u2014and as Marx explained, it is very\noften counter-revolution which acts as a whip driving the revolution forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, industry in Ghana is much more developed and,\nunlike in Ethiopia, the working-class is a substantial force, with a militant\ntradition of independent organisation. More than half a million workers in\nGhana are in trade unions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The international reverberations of carrying the Ghanaian\nrevolution to completion would be felt throughout West Africa and Africa as a\nwhole. It would be much more difficult to consolidate a totalitarian regime on\nStalinist lines from above, moving to suppress the democratic voice of the\nworking class. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, for Ghana to swing over to economic dependence on\nthe Soviet Union would be regarded as a very mixed blessing by the Russian\nbureaucracy. It could be faced with even bigger requirements of economic and\nmilitary aid in the case of Ghana than in Ethiopia, where a massive arms bill\nequivalent to $2,2 billion has been incurred. It would not be surprising if\nSoviet diplomats are presently exerting pressure on Rawlings to prevent him\ngoing over the brink.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The power of Nigeria, almost on the borders of Ghana, is\nanother factor tending to stave off an ‘Ethiopian’ development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Intervention<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the 1979 coup Nigeria cut off oil supplies to Ghana\nas a warning to Rawlings. Now Ghana looks to Libya for oil. The possibility of\na Nigerian military intervention would be a factor weighing with Rawlings and\nhis associates. But that would be an extremely dangerous course for the\nNigerian ruling class (or imperialism) to take under the present circumstances,\nsince in turn this could set fire to a revolutionary movement in Nigeria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Throughout West Africa conditions are ripe for revolution.\nThis was demonstrated in an extraordinary way even in tiny Gambia in 1981.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Gambia has only one industry (except the obligatory\nbrewery), and its economy is dependent solely on groundnuts and tourism. With a\npopulation of 600 000, it has only four secondary schools, no standing army,\nand only a small paramilitary police force of 358 men.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the crisis in society when groundnut production fell\nfrom 132 000 tons to 78 000 tons as a result of drought, produced something\nunheard of in history\u2014a revolution by\nthe police force demanding the setting up of the “dictatorship of the\nproletariat”!<\/strong> (In such confused and distorted ways the ripeness for a\nrevolutionary transformation of society is shown.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Military intervention from neighbouring Senegal put a stop\nto that, and the Gambia has now been formally integrated with the Senegalese\nstate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In capitalist Sierra Leone, a former colony of Britain, the\nregime of President Stevens has been in severe trouble. In September 1981, in\nresponse to 200% inflation, there were mass demonstrations and a national\nstrike that closed the diamond and coal mines and even the Freetown market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A state of emergency was imposed, the Labour Congress was\nbanned, its leaders jailed, and all opposition has been gagged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While malnutrition affects 80% of the children in Sierra\nLeone, the country continues to be ruled by a ostentatiously rich and corrupt\nelite. But now it will face movement after mass movement for its overthrow. (It\nis, incidentally, noteworthy that the detested Internal Security Unit in Sierra\nLeone has been trained by Cuba and China).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The turbulence of West Africa is repeated to greater or\nlesser extent throughout the continent. In country after country there are\nstruggles for trade union rights, for the defence of the workers and peasants\nagainst falling standards and against oppressive regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We are now in a new epoch, both of the world revolution and\nof the African revolution. The fate of the African revolution is bound together\non a continental scale, and in turn tied to the movement of the working class\nin the industrialised world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rise of the working class as a revolutionary force in any important country, with a class-conscious programme and leadership, will have immense repercussions throughout Africa. Within Africa, a victorious revolution in either South Africa or Nigeria would in turn lead to the transformation of the continent, and open the way to a pan-African Socialist Federation, to join in the socialist transformation of the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continue to Chapter Seven<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Africa The great European powers which plundered and colonised Africa have left it with the most crippling legacy of poverty and under-development. The complex political […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":709,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-744","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"aioseo_notices":[],"acf":[],"_hostinger_reach_plugin_has_subscription_block":false,"_hostinger_reach_plugin_is_elementor":false,"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/744","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=744"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/744\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":750,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/744\/revisions\/750"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/709"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=744"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}