{"id":494,"date":"2019-09-03T09:51:11","date_gmt":"2019-09-03T07:51:11","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marxistworkersparty.org.za\/?page_id=494"},"modified":"2019-09-03T10:04:31","modified_gmt":"2019-09-03T08:04:31","slug":"chapter-four","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/?page_id=494","title":{"rendered":"Chapter Four"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Political Situation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Political developments since\nindependence have basically flowed along the channels laid down in the Lancaster\nHouse agreement although there have been some new features.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Formally speaking, the Lancaster House\nagreement established in Zimbabwe a parliamentary democracy based on universal\nfranchise (though with the concessions to the whites in terms of reserved white\nseats).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time there was an \u2018Africanisation\u2019\nof the state machinery, through the phasing out of the old white personnel\u2014to\nbe replaced basically by the educated black strata who sat out the guerilla war\nin overseas universities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But in practice, the most\nimportant development that has taken place since independence is the\ndiminishing role of parliament, and the increasing concentration of power in\nthe hands of Ministers, etc, and above all in the hands of Mugabe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is a result of the gulf\nbetween the objective interests the regime serves and the political base it has\nto try to sustain among the workers and peasants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Lancaster House agreement\nlaid the basis for the promotion of the black middle class to positions in the\nstate as junior partners with imperialism. In exchange they agreed to preserve\nthe productive foundations of private ownership: on the land and in the\nfactories, mines, and banks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The foreign ownership of the\nmeans of production which amounts to two-thirds of all capital was not to be\ntampered with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These conditions were spelt out\nin the cold constitutional language of the Lancaster House agreement. But the\nonly political force with the base of social support which could carry them out\nin practice was the radical nationalist leadership, whose popularity rested on\nthe fact that it had led the guerilla struggle for power, and had been invested\nby the peasants, youth and workers with their hopes for achieving a decent\nlife.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The regime is buffeted on the one\nhand by foreign and local capitalists, determined to sustain their interests,\nand on the other hand by the uneasy conglomeration of petty-bourgeois, peasant,\nand working-class interests which are its base of support. In a relatively\nunderdeveloped economy beset by the world capitalist crisis it can satisfy neither\nthe capitalists nor the mass of working people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is this which explains both\nthe zig-zagging course of policy and rhetoric, and the tendency for the regime\nto elevate itself above any democratic process and concentrate power in\nexecutive hands \u2014 a process which will be taken further with the establishment\nof a \u2018one-party state\u2019. This kind of regime, zig-zagging, elevated above the\nmasses, balancing between contending classes neither of which is able to\nestablish its clear supremacy\u2014 but based on a capitalist state machine and\ndefending capitalism\u2014is what Marxism refers to as bourgeois Bonapartism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the middle-class leadership\nattacks imperialism\u2014for example, protesting against low prices of raw materials,\nthe growing foreign debts, the lack of real aid, the undermining of an indigenous\nblack capitalist class, and imperialism’s support for racism in South\nAfrica\u2014they pretend that they are ‘at one’ with the masses, and putting forward\nthe position of the workers and rural poor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But they do not explain that\nthese problems cannot be solved within the framework of capitalism, or mobilise\na struggle headed by the working class to break\nwith capitalism<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ln reality, the middle-class\nleadership is engaged merely in a struggle with the imperialists over the\nspoils of the wealth produced by the working class. Without being able to\nsatisfy the demands of the workers, youth, and peasants\u2014or even of the whole of\nthe middle class\u2014 they are trying to sustain the support of the masses in a\nbattle over the surplus in order to enrich themselves first and foremost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus they are forced on the one\nhand to turn to state control and suppression of the very classes to which they\nlook for support. On the other hand, because of their impotence against\nimperialism, they fight among themselves for the crumbs which fall off the table\nof capitalism. The splits take place along regional and tribal lines, with a\nfestering of corruption, favouritism, and patronage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is this volatile mixture of\nfavouritism and repression which has forced tribal and regional factions to\nform among the Shona petty bourgeois leaders who head ZANU(PF). The growing\ndisunity at the top has led Mugabe increasingly to take personal command of\ncontroversial issues and to take power into his own hands. The leadership\nincreasingly preaches the virtues of a \u2018one-party state\u2019 \u2014 i.e. of increased\ndictatorship\u2014as a means suppressing tribalism and class antagonisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already, the parliamentary\nformalities are increasingly being dropped and the government rules through\nemergency regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A number of sympathetic studies\nof the Zimbrabwean state have concluded that the executive and security\napparatus enjoys enormous power and has progressively gained more autonomy from\nparliament, the courts, and the other apparatuses of state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Repressive powers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Central Intelligence\nOrganisation (CIO) which is part of the ‘Prime Minister’s Office’ and directly\ncontrolled by Mugabe has been rapidly expanded. Its top intelligence officers\nare still the whites who organised the defence of Smith’s regime against the\nguerilla war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The security legislation used by\nSmith to attack the nationalist movement and unions has not been abolished but\nextended. More than 60 regulations made in terms of the notorious Emergency\nPowers Act and Law and Order Act of the 1960s have been issued on a wide variety\nof topics. Regulations in terms of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975\nwhich remove any legal constraints on the armed forces were revived in July\n1982.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cabinet Ministers dealing with\nsecurity matters have exceptional powers to detain, to ban meetings, and use\nother legal means to suppress opposition. When persons accused of political\ncrimes have been acquitted by the courts, redetentions are common.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reports of Commissions of\nEnquiry into complaints against the security forces have not been made public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These have been the means by\nwhich opposition parties, striking workers, squatters on unused land, and\nMarxists in ZANU(PF) and the unions etc have been repressed. Rarely has this\nsecurity apparatus taken action against the old reactionaries\u2014its victims are\nbasically the workers, peasants, and youth who are thought to be political\nopponents of the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through using the repressive\npowers of the state, the ZANU(PF) leaders have cleared the way to a one-party\ndictatorship. But, without a break with capitalism, this will not solve the\nnational-tribal divisions which are festering in Zimbabwe society\u2014but only\nafter perhaps a temporary period, serve to intensify them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The national question<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is clear that in Zimbabwe the\ncompromise with capitalism has resulted in painfully slow progress on the land\nquestion\u2014the fundamental issue of the Zimbabwean revolution. The postponement\nof a thorough-going settlement of the land question has fuelled the distrust of\nthe Ndebele peasantry in the Harare government which had also disarmed the\nZIPRA guerillas and failed to provide jobs for the youth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such mistrust arose that some\nyouth took up arms against the state. Of course, not all ‘dissidents’ came from\nthis background. Many acts of terrorism have clearly been committed by bandits\nsent in from South Africa, and in some cases apparently even by state agents\ntrying to create an excuse for police action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sabotage or government projects,\nthe killing of ZANU officials etc, brought down the terrible wrath of the armed\nforces under the command of the ZANU(PF) leaders. Killings of peasants,\ntorture, detentions and military rule over Matabeleland followed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In short, the compromise with\ncapitalism led to an enormous sharpening of national antagonism between Ndebele\nand Shona.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Matabeleland is now bitterly\nalienated after the deaths of hundreds or possibly thousands at the hands of\nthe armed forces, particularly the 5th Brigade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Ndebele minority now\ninterprets its hardships as the result of being a tribal-national minority\u2014they\nfeel nationally oppressed at the hands of the Shona-dominated Harare\ngovernment. The lack of progress on the land and social questions (there has\nbeen no land resettlement in Matabeleland implemented yet) has made the problem\nmuch worse as politicians have sought petty advantage in tribal chauvinism.\nBoth parties exploit their tribal base.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The worsening of the national\nquestion since independence reveals similar processes to those described by\nTrotsky in his History of the Russian\nRevolution<\/em>. There, the overthrow of the oppressive Tsar’s imperial regime,\nand the aspirations for democracy which this brought into the open, led\noppressed national minorities to press towards greater autonomy and their own\nstates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In similar fashion, the relative\nunification of the black majority achieved in the struggle against the Smith\nregime has been reversed since the downfall of the regime. With no solution\noffered to the social problems through a break with capitalism, the aspirations\nof the Ndebele masses are channelled through their consciousness of oppression\nas a ‘national group’. In the future, without a break with capitalism, this\ncould even lead to mass Ndebele support for a state of their own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the point of view of the development\nof the productive forces, Marxism favours the largest possible political units,\novercoming the barriers which ‘nation-states’ have posed on economic\ndevelopment\u2014but only through voluntary amalgamation and in no way through\ncoercion. Thus the Russian Marxist Lenin explained that, in conditions of national\noppression, Marxism must implacably defend the democratic right of nations to\nself-determination, including their right to secession and establishment of\ntheir own state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was not a matter of abstract\nor moral principle, but a vital part of the programme for working-class\nrevolution. By championing the rights of the oppressed, the Marxists aimed to\nprevent bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalists from dividing the\nworking-class, and peddling utopian capitalist solutions for their real\nmaterial problems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In reality, by defending the\nright of nations to self-determination, Marxism aims to unite the working-class\nof different nationalities in the struggle for democracy and socialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time Lenin argued\nthat there could be no concessions to separatism in the unions and\nworking-class parties\u2014the workers internationally have to build and protect\ntheir organised unity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This basic standpoint of Marxism\nis not to be found in the leadership of either nationalist party in Zimbabwe.\nHowever, since ZANU(PF) is the party in power which has carried through the\ncompromise with capitalism and deployed the armed forces against the Ndebele\nminority, its leaders have to take the main responsibility for the worsening\nnational question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is this leadership which meted\nout brutal repression against the first stirrings of revolt, and which is now\nattempting to impose a one-party dictatorship on the Zimbabwean people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marxism has always strongly\nopposed the imposition of unity and the holding together of nations by the use\nof troops, which has the effect of bitterly dividing the workers and peasants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The turn now by the ZANU(PF)\nleadership towards unity talks is not because of tender feelings for the\nNdebele workers and peasants by Mugabe, but because the military-police methods\nhave been exhausted. Nevertheless this turn opens up a new political situation\nwhich is likely to draw workers, peasants and youth into intense political discussion\nabout the way forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Elections<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since independence there have\nbeen a number of political crises and some reshuffling of the leadership\u2014but\nnone of these changes have defined a new course to solve the political and\neconomic problems of Zimbabwe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The July 1985 elections were\ndesigned by the Mugabe government to be a conclusive victory for ZANU(PF). But\nthey have brought about changes not anticipated by the leadership. Taken as a\nwhole, these changes amount to a turning-point in the post-independence\npolitics of Zimbabwe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU approached\nthe elections with big illusions. The ZANU(PF) leadership had high expectations\nthat the Ndebele masses would be persuaded or forced to vote for their\ncandidates. Last minute efforts were made to establish an Ndebele-speaking\nleadership for the campaign in Matabeleland. They expected that ZAPU could be\nbroken by the crushing weight of military occupation and detentions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, the ZAPU\nleadership had the illusion that the Shona masses would turn away from ZANU(PF)\nand give a ‘protest vote’ to ZAPU. They thought that the undoubted\ndissatisfaction of the Shona masses with the corruption, lack of housing, high\nprices, and fewer jobs would turn them to ZAPU. This, ZAPU members believed,\nwould build a sufficient groundswell for ZAPU to win.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Results<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election results of an\noverwhelming majority for ZANU(PF) but also of obstinate support for ZAPU in\nMatabeleland, were the outcome of several different processes taking place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before the elections there were\nsigns that the economic upturn, based on the good rains, had brought particular\nbenefits to the peasantry. An upper layer had benefitted most, but hope of a\nbetter life for all also affected the peasant mass.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The petty bourgeois politicians\nof ZANU(PF) constantly attacked the ‘lazy workers’, and praised the peasantry\nfor their hard work. They know that the peasantry form their most reliable base\nof support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the towns, on the other hand,\nthe social problems were much more obvious, and the situation was more difficult\nto control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As was acknowledged in the Financial Times<\/em> (11 June 1985), the real\nchallenge to the government did not come from the fragmented opposition parties\nbut from “the growing dissatisfaction among the urban population” \u2014\nthe working class in the cities and towns. The government showed its\nrecognition of this fact by attacking the Marxists in the trade unions and\nZANU(PF) in the run-up to the elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This discontent among the urban\nworking class was shown in widespread criticism of economic policies, in\nquestions raised in party meetings, and in the angry mass opposition to corrupt\nor unrepresentative ZANU(PF) councillors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The potential strength of the\nworking-class opposition was shown in the massive marches, especially by the\nwomen, against local party leaders in some towns. The party leadership took\nthis discontent seriously. In some cases ministers were sent to negotiate with\ndemonstrators and promised to look into their grievances. At the same time\nthuggery and violence by the Youth Brigades was encouraged to intimidate urban\npeople even in areas where the opposition parties had little support. It was\nnoticeable in the early stages of the election campaign that the urban masses\nfelt voting would change nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ln the bigger towns, especially\nHarare, the turnout to register for the elections was very slow. “People\nseem to treat the vote with levity; and yet thousands of Zimbabweans died for\nit\u201d, complained the Sunday Times<\/em> (2\nJanuary 1985).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This casual attitude towards the\nvote showed an awareness among the urban working class that power was not in\ntheir hands. Most could see there was no real alternative to ZANU(PF). Many\nfelt its victory would lead to a one-party dictatorship which would have to be\naccepted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The indifference among the urban\npeople, particularly in Harare, produced a panicky response from the\nleadership. Every opposition statement, however feeble, produced a thundering\nreply from party leaders using their newspapers and radios to the full.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an important tactical switch,\nMugabe pulled back from making the one-party state the key question of the\nelection. He also made concessions to persuade people to vote for the ruling\nparty. The workers were given a wage increase of 15% and the government\npromised that the new Labour Act would operate in their interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the rural areas, discontent\nthreatened from older and traditional people over legal challenges to the lobola\ncustom. To calm this down, Mugabe called the first gathering of chiefs since\nindependence. He promised that fathers’ traditional rights over their daughters\nwould continue, and made concessions to the powers of the chiefs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ZANU(PF) presented itself as the\nparty of order and development and attacked ZAPU as the party of the\ndissidents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To make his election victory more\ncredible internationally, Mugabe allowed opposition parties some access to the\npress. ZANU’s face towards the Ndebele minority, however, remained truculent\nand dictatorial. In his personal appearances in Matabeleland, Mugabe promised a\ntougher policy towards the Ndebele, hoping to force acceptance of ZANU(PF)\u2019s\npower to rule ‘forever’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ZAPU approached the elections in\na weak state of organisation. Virtually every party organiser had been\ndetained. The reign of terror by the state after the Midlands riots of June\n1984 broke ZAPU’s organised support in Beitbridge, Chinoyi, and most of the\nMidlands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ZAPU’s electoral strategy was for\na ‘united front’ of all ‘progressives’ to unite Zimbabwe, and the one-party\nstate was opposed. But the leaders put forward no programme for unity so it\nwould not exclude any group! At the same time as calling for a ‘united front’\nof all ‘progressives’ it launched bitter attacks on the ‘fascism’ of ZANU, thus\ndeliberately excluding ZANU from among the ‘progressives’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ‘united front’ could thus be\nnothing more than a reactionary anti-Mugabe bloc of all pro-capitalist opposition\nparties and Smith. Such a mixed bag of sell-outs, racists, and opportunists had\nno chance of success. Not even the assassination of five leading members of\nUANC could bring ZAPU and UANC together in an electoral pact. All-in-all there\nwere 258 candidates, mainly from the fragmented opposition parties, fighting\nfor only 80 seats!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the hysterical atmosphere of\nparty violence, which was only a thin cover for tribalism, ZAPU ‘s supporters\noutside Matabeleland retreated. In the elections to the district council in the\nBeitbridge area, formerly a ZAPU stronghold it did not win a single seat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But in the run-up to the\nparliamentary elections, District Council results in Matabeleland showed a different\npicture. Here, with Ndebele in an overwhelming majority, there was a fierce\nloyalty to ZAPU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ZAPU candidates were almost\nuniversally elected even when voters were threatened with violence if they\nvoted for \u2018The Dissident’\u2014that is the ZAPU candidate. The government was so embarrassed\nthat the District Council election results were not published for months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The white elections<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The white elections were a\nvictory for the die-hard elements among the whites; Smith’s party candidates\nwon 5 out of the 20 seats reserved for whites. The success of anti-Mugabe\ncandidates in these elections revealed a trend which only Marxism\u2014though it did\nnot anticipate it entirely\u2014could explain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The compromise with the whites,\nenshrined in Lancaster House and in the policy of the ZANU(PF) leadership, is\nnot a policy equally supported on both sides. There has been precious little\n\u2018change of heart\u2019 among the whites, only a recognition of the current\nrelationship of power. Their acceptance of the policy of \u2018reconciliation\u2019 has\nnot changed their attitude towards ordinary Zimbabwean workers and peasants,\nwhich remains one of contempt and racial arrogance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ZANU(PF) leadership was taken\nin by flattery, fawning, and offers of gifts to speed their corruption, as\nevidence of genuine co-operation at a political level. But the present\nsituation is a graphic illustration of the results of class-collaboration. The\nwhite bourgeois and landowners have taken advantage of the ‘historic compromise’\nof Lancaster House to secure their own position and preach the most reactionary\nmonetarist doctrines. The results of these policies\u2014higher prices, wage\nfreezes, redundancies and factory closures\u2014are then blamed on the ‘socialism’\nof Mugabe! <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the election results have\nknocked a few potholes into the smooth road of collaboration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two political trends among the\nwhites offered themselves to the white electorate: Smith’s Conservative Alliance\n(CAZ) and the ‘independents’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Smith and his aging cronies\nlaunched a campaign blatantly defending capitalism and his past record in putting\nthe interests of the whites first. Undoubtedly part of Smith\u2019s strategy was to\nform an anti-Mugabe bloc in the West, as he stood as a candidate for the first\ntime in Bulawayo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2018independents\u2019, generally the\ndirect representatives of the big capitalist interests follow a policy of\naccepting the compromise in order more effectively to combat the socialist\naspirations of the Zimbabwean masses. They were enthusiastically endorsed by\nthe ZANU leadership as ‘genuine non-racialists’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Undoubtedly a factor in the\nanti-Mugabe vote among the whites was the fear of a one-party dictatorship, of\nZimbabwe taking the path of so many African countries of tribal violence and\ncivil war. The whites did not support the idea of genuine democratic rights,\nbut they feared the growth of arbitrary state power would lead to a loss of\ntheir privileges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are thus some differences\nin approach to the one-party state question. Big capital is cautiously in\nfavour of a one-party dictatorship\u2014if such a government could secure the peace\nby agreement or by the gun in Matabeleland. lt is fairly confident of finding\nnew ways of incorporating white privilege and capitalist interests into the\nframework of a one-party dictatorship under Mugabe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ZANU leadership has\nencouraged this approach by promising to include a number of white candidates\non the ZANU ticket in a future one-party \u2018election\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faced with the challenge of the\nwhites to his authority, Mugabe fumed but retreated. He said that the 20 white seats\nentrenched in the constitution “must go immediately.” But he did not\nthen seek the support of ZAPU’s MPs to abolish the 20 white seats entrenched in\nthe constitution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the agreement of ZAPU the\n70% \u2018yes\u2019 vote in the House of Assembly necessary to abolish the white seats after\nApril 1987 would be reached. This would open the way to forcing through a\none-party state with a unanimous vote before April 1990. After this date only a\n70% vote in the Assembly is needed to establish a one-party state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of seeking ZAPU’s\nsupport, he escalated his political attack on ZAPU in a fresh attempt to solve the\n‘ZAPU problem’. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

A turning-point<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not only the white, but the other\nelection results surprised both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders, and set in motion a\nseries of political events which have now resulted in the opening of\nnegotiations between the leadership of both parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The underlying political process\nrevealed by the elections has meant that the talks which are now taking place\nare qualitatively different from the many sessions of talks previously held between\nZANU(PF) and ZAPU. The reasons for this change lie in the shattering of the\nillusions promoted by the respective leaders in the support they would each\nreceive nation-wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ironically, the election results\nconfirmed the over-whelming support for ZANU(PF) among the Shona majority\u2014but\nfell well short of being a conclusive victory. On the face of it, ZANU(PF) made\nmajor gains by increasing its vote from 1,7m to 2,2m between 1980 and 1985, out\nof an electorate or 2,9m. This support was based on the hope that Mugabe would\nimplement measures in favour of the masses (socialism), if only the political\nobstacles in his way could be removed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the crushing majority won by\nZANU(PF) nation-wide could not hide the fact that it could not make in-roads\ninto ZAPU’s Matabeleland base. Despite a reign of terror in Matabeleland marked\nby forced attendance at ZANU(PF) meetings, forced buying of ZANU(PF) party\ncards, torture, massacres and blackmail (all of which served to warn the Ndebele\nof the dire consequences of continuing to support ZAPU), the vote for ZANU(PF)\nwas only 12,9 per cent of the Matabeleland electorate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Significantly, the firmest\nsupport for ZANU(PF) came from the Bulawayo area, from Shona businessmen and\ncivil servants attracted there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problems within ZANU(PF) were\nhidden under a barrage of attacks on ZAPU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the election results were\nalso a body-blow for the ZAPU leadership. Despite considerable urban\ndiscontent, a protest vote in favour of the opposition parties did not develop\noutside Matabeleland as the workers could not see any advantage to them in\nanti-Mugabe party groupings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For ZANU(PF) the results\nconfirmed its predominance as the party representing the majority Shona,\nMuzorewa’s UANC is to all intents and purposes dead. ZANU(Sithole) secured one\nseat; but, despite some support in the south-east, is also breaking up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For ZAPU the results confirmed\nthe fact the leadership had tried to avoid: that ZAPU is now a parry of the\nNdebele without the prospect of gaining even a protest vote in other areas of\nZimbabwe. ZAPU\u2019s support in the eastern two-thirds of the country dominated by\nZANU(PF) virtually collapsed, and in the Midlands the party vote was halved\nfrom 27 per cent in 1980 to 14 per cent in this election.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The shocks and tremors within the\nZAPU leadership were shown when they did not seriously challenge the fairness\nof the elections. The leadership and activists were faced with the realisation\nthat ZAPU is a tribal-national party of a minority. On this basis there were\nonly two alternatives\u2014either a deal with ZANU(PF) or a hardening regional line\nleading towards separatism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some ZANU(PF) leaders reported\nthat some Ndebele were already talking of the \u2018Republic of Mthwakazi\u2019 and that\nMatabeleland already felt like a state within a state. But Nkomo calculated\nthat it would be more to his advantage to seek a deal with Mugabe than to\nencourage separation. The majority of the Ndebele were still against such a\ndirection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although fairly soon after the\nelections Nkomo made overtures to Mugabe, the reaction of the ZANU(PF)\nleadership was one of intensified repression. By making almost daily threats to\nban ZAPU, Mugabe was prepared to take the inter-party struggle to the brink.\nAny further steps would have driven ZAPU underground and sparked off fresh\nexplosions in Matabeleland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These extreme policies were the\ninevitable result of the dilly-dallying on the land question and the lack of\nprogress on all social quesions. On the basis of compromise with capitalism no\ndecisive progress was possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appointment of Enos Nkala as\nMinister of Home Affairs after the election showed how determined Mugabe was to\nsecure the complete surrender of Nkomo, rather than settle for an uneasy deal.\nNkala, himself Ndebele-speaking, is a long-standing enemy of Nkomo. He had\nstood as a ZANU(PF) candidate in Matabeleland and lost his deposit. Yet after the\nelections Mugabe insulted the Ndebele people by appointing him to settle issues\nwith ZAPU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new security apparatus was set\nup and detentions of ZAPU leaders followed. Nkomo’s body-guards were disarmed\nduring a campaign to have him \u2018eliminated\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With hindsight it now appears\nthat the role of Nkala was to deliver Nkomo to the negotiating table bound and\ngagged. With any remaining national ambitions of Nkomo destroyed, his lieutenants\nand followers could be brought into the ruling party. ZANU(PF) would then have\nthe mantle of a truly national party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is impossible to follow the\ndynamics of the moves towards a deal without an understanding of the situation\nin Southern Africa as a whole. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The pressures on Mugabe<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A powerful factor in Mugabe’s\nthinking must have been the devastation of Mozambique and Angola by reactionary\nbands directly supported by South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Up to 20,000 Zimbabwean troops\nare now deployed in Mozambique to secure lines of transport and combat the MNR.\nThe tops of the security apparatus have no illusions that a quick and easy\nvictory is likely because of the devastation of the country and the collapse of\nFRELIMO’s authority in many areas. A costly, drawn-out military operation,\nwhich is most likely, will drain increasing resources from the Zimbabwean\nstate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Faced with this prospect, Mugabe\nhad every reason to consider the military cost of repression in Matabeleland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a pragmatic politician he was\nforced to recognise that the military occupation of Matabeleland had not produced\nthe political results he had expected. Continuation of this policy would\ninevitably invite deeper South African involvement in support of reactionary\nbands, which would seek the support of an oppressed tribal-national group.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fighting on these two fronts, it\nwas likely that the army and police would become bogged down and weary. The\npolitical implications were dangerous to the ruling elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was an element of risk in\nthe strategy of smashing ZAPU and forcing Nkomo to the wall. There was always\nthe possibility that Nkomo, incapable of providing a socialist solution, could\nhave been driven in the direction of separatism and alliance with South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, despite being defenceless,\nNkomo had an important card to play\u2014the continued and solid support of the\nNdebele for ZAPU. This meant that the unequal partnership of convenience would\nnot have to be a humiliating surrender for Nkomo. Even so, it will involve him\nin a less powerful position than he had before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is reported that the deal will\nbe based on the representation of ZAPU within the leading organs of ZANU(PF) in\nproportion to its electoral support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, these practical arrangements\nwill cause new headaches and tensions within the ZANU(PF) leadership. These can\nbe overcome (and then only temporarily) by Mugabe taking increasing power into\nhis own hands, and balancing between the different political-regional factions\nwithin ZANU(PF).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The working class and peasantry\nmay wonder at the amazing zig-zags of the politicians. But many will sigh with\nrelief that Mugabe had the boldness to attempt to resolve the tribal-national\ndivision of the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For all these internal and\nexternal reasons it is likely that the deal will he made, despite the\nformidable hurdles which will have to be jumped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The incorporation of what remains\nof the ZAPU leadership into ZANU(PF), under the slogan of unity, will\nundoubtedly bring a welcome pause to the tribal-national battles. The frenzy\nwhipped up by the ZANU(PF) leadership before and after the elections will now\nrecede. But the poison of tribal prejudice has seeped into the consciousness of\nsome sections of the working class, and certainly remains in the peasantry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building ‘unity’ at the top by\nrearranging party positions and securing the voluntary winding up of ZAPU will\nbring a temporary pause to the vicious anti-ZAPU campaign which carried all the\nmarks of a crude tribal struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This will remove one of the\nformidable obstacles to rebuilding the unity of workers in Bulawayo, Harare and\nthe crucial area of the Midlands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Problems of one-party rule<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time it will open up\nnew problems in the ruling pally. The incorporation of selected ZAPU leaders\ninto privileged positions, at the expense of ZANU(PF) careerists, has been\nfought with the greatest energy by sections of the latter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even though Mugabe may succeed in\nover-riding this opposition and ‘uniting’ with Nkomo, this will import all the\ndivisions of the middle-class leadership into a single party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After a period of celebration and\n‘reconciliation’, the petty squabbling among the leaders will resume. Basically\nthe ‘new’ ruling party will consist of ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland, and\nZANU(PF) supporters in the East. In the Midlands, where the parties are more\nevenly divided, there are likely to be fierce battles to determine which local\nparty leadership predominates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the unity deal is seen to\nhave solved none of the social problems, there will be a growing realisation\nthat the politicians have looked after themselves very nicely. The workers and\npeasants will want to put forward genuine leaders of the working people to\nreplace corrupt party hacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Workers of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU will\nbe able to see more clearly the need for class<\/strong>\npolicies against their common exploitation, and seek unity with their fellow\nworkers against pro-capitalist leaders. Ndebele workers particularly will find\nthat the ZAPU leaders have done nothing to secure their interests, and will\nlook for a way forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But spontaneous tendencies\ntowards working-class unity can be cut across by the deep-rooted tribal and\nnational divisions by unscrupulous politicians. The national question will not\ngo away just because a single party has been proclaimed, as the Karanga-Zezuru\nconflicts within ZANU(PF) have demonstrated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After a temporary pause, it is\ninevitable that tribal-national discrimination and oppression will resurface. Since\ncapitalism cannot deliver the goods, the competition for land, jobs, and\neducation will follow the old tribal and regional channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only a genuine socialist leadership in the working class can cut across this process, by building and sustaining firm unity among Shona and Ndebele workers on the basis of linking the struggle for decent wages, jobs, homes, education, and land to the struggle for socialism against the pro-capitalist leadership of both ZAPU and ZANU(PF).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continue to Chapter Five<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Political Situation Political developments since independence have basically flowed along the channels laid down in the Lancaster House agreement although there have been some […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":477,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-494","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"aioseo_notices":[],"acf":[],"_hostinger_reach_plugin_has_subscription_block":false,"_hostinger_reach_plugin_is_elementor":false,"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/494","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=494"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/494\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":510,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/494\/revisions\/510"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/477"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=494"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}