Since the Lancaster House\nagreement in late 1979, the people or Zimbabwe have experienced many important\nchanges. Most important has been the achievement of black majority rule and the\nend of the war which cost the lives of 30,000 people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the period following, many\npeasants were able to build permanent houses for the first time in many years\nwithout fear that they would be pulled down again. Families were reunited. Ex-combatants\nstruggled to catch up with lost opportunities, particularly in education.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Under Mugabe’s ZANU(PF) government,\nmany social reforms were introduced, in the fields of education, health, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Most of all, independence brought\na feeling that the African people would at last have their people in\ngovernment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet the first elections since\nindependence, held in July 1985, while producing an even bigger majority for\nZANU(PF), at the same time revealed numerous signs of the growing\ndisappointment among the masses that what they had expected from majority rule\nhad not yet been achieved. The sore of tribal-national division between Shona\nand Ndebele was the most stark reflection that the Zimbabwean revolution had\nbecome stalled. What is the way forward?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The draft of this document was\nwritten at the time of those elections, to address that central question. Revisions\nwere subsequently made to the draft, circulated in early 1986, to clarify its\narguments, rather than to update it. In fact, judged against the broad sweep of\nsubsequent events, its projection of likely developments in Zimbabwe, and the\ntasks for Zimbabwean workers, youth and peasants, has stood the test of time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, in one respect\nat least, events have served to highlight more sharply a crucial determining\nfactor in Zimbabwean perspectives. What has become clearer is that Zimbabwe\nforms the key target in the overall destabilisation strategy of the South\nAfrican regime in Southern Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Zimbabwe and SA imperialism<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Of South Africa’s neighbours,\nZimbabwe has the most developed industrial base. It is therefore more able to\nresist South African pressures, and to provide a potential counterweight around\nwhich other Southern African states can rally against the apartheid regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The elections early in March 1980\nwhich brought Mugabe to power were followed within days by the formation of\nSADCC. These two events devastated the strategy of a ‘Constellation of Southern\nAfrican States’ which Botha had put forward in 1979.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite Mugabe saying at that\ntime that his government would not be directly involved in the struggle in\nSouth Africa, the ZANU(PF) victory and the relatively developed capitalist base\nplaced Zimbabwe in the objective position of principal obstacle to South Africa’s\nimperialist ambitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The utopian plans of SADCC for\nthe economic disengagement of the Southern African states would appear\nabsolutely ridiculous if it were not for Zimbabwe’s participation. There is at\nleast some limited<\/strong> scope for interlinking\nthese economies around the axis of Zimbabwean industry, although that could not\novercome the enormous preponderance of SA economic power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zimbabwean capitalism would like\nto take over domination of the Southern African market for itself. This (even\nto the limited extent it would proceed) is an objective basis of conflict\nbetween Zimbabwe and South Africa, despite the extensive penetration of Zimbabwe\nby South African capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most of Zimbabwe’s foreign trade\npasses through South Africa. But the Pretoria regime cannot use this leverage\nin quite the same way as it squeezes or threatens Lesotho, Mozambique or\nBotswana\u2014because SA’s own trade routes to Zambia and Malawi are heavily dependent\non smooth passage through Zimbabwe. <\/p>\n\n\n\n There are features of an uneasy\nstand-off in relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. There is a constant\nstruggle\u2014now more open, now more hidden\u2014in which Harare strives to lessen South\nAfrican pressure on it, especially in trying to develop or maintain alternative\ntransport routes to those through the South African ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Inevitable confrontation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The inevitable confrontation\nbetween Zimbabwe and South Africa has been partly concealed by secret negotiations\nbetween security officials, by Mugabe’s outright support for the Nkomati\nAgreement, and by both sides realising how much damage they could inflict on\neach other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For some time after Zimbabwe\nachieved independence it appeared that South Africa was forced to hold back\nfrom attempts to destabilise Zimbabwe. South African support for the\n‘dissidents’ in Matabeleland was half-hearted; the Preferential Trade Agreement\nwith Zimbabwe was renewed regularly; and the secret security talks continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At that time it was important to\nstress that the prospect of revolution at home would force the apartheid regime\nto lash out wildly and make “peaceful relations between the two countries\nimpossible”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is now clear that a key\nelement in the South African destabilisation strategy has been to undermine Zimbabwe’s\npotential leadership role in the region by forcing its trade through South\nAfrican ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once this is clearly grasped it\nbecomes easier to see why South Africa continued to give active support to MNR\ncounter-revolutionary banditry in Mozambique despite all the concessions made\nto Botha by Samora Machel in the 1984 Nkomati Agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite incidents such as the\nmilitary attack on Harare in May this year and the provocation of holding up\ntransport at the Beit Bridge border in August, the main direct thrust of South\nAfrican aggression against Zimbabwe<\/strong>\nremains within Mozambique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Botha regime’s policy of further\nweakening the FRELIMO government through maintaining or increasing the pressure\nof the MNR has a central aim: to try and ensure that all Zimbabwean trade\nthrough Maputo will have to go via South Africa and that the Beira line to the\nsea will never be secure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This policy has succeeded to the\nextent that Zimbabwean trade through Mozambique has been reduced from 54% in\n1983 to 5% in 1986. This has occurred despite the higher freight charges\nthrough South Africa, and despite Zimbabwe’s efforts in support of the FRELIMO\ngovernment against the MNR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n South African destabilisation\npolicies have succeeded in making SADCC states now more<\/strong> dependent on South Africa than in 1980.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mugabe has responded to the\nprocess of slow strangulation by sending in troops to defend the Beira line and\nby launching a diplomatic offensive to raise funds for the ‘Beira corridor’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He and FRELIMO have succeeded in\ngetting the British and US governments to support the rehabilitation of the Beira\nand Nacala-Malawi railway lines. In the case of the Thatcher government this\nsupport includes important military assistance to FRELIMO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On an issue such as the Beira\nline the policies of British and US imperialism and those of the Botha regime\ncan diverge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Western imperialist powers\nare concerned to stabilise Southern Africa for capitalism; South African\nimperialism to destabilise and weaken Southern African resistance to its\ndomination. London and Washington would like to see a capitalist counter-weight\nin Southern Africa to act as a pressure for reform on the Botha regime;\nPretoria wants no obstacles to its freedom of manoeuvre and repression at home\nor in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Western powers are concerned\nlest SA pressure on the SADCC states induces them to turn towards the USSR and\nEastern Europe. Last, and not least, the big capitalist powers are out to\nsecure the Southern African markets for themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The SADCC leaders base their\nwhole strategy on trying to exploit these divergences in policy between the different\nimperialisms. But this cannot provide the way forward for the development of\nSouthern Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Already South Africa and Zimbabwe\nare engaged in a proxy war in Mozambique. Mugabe has announced after the death\nof Samora Machel that he will not tolerate the MNR coming to power; South\nAfrica\u2019s puppet \u2018declared war\u2019 on Zimbabwe in response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a commentator recently wrote:\n“The MNR\u2019s declaration of war has effectively widened the range of options\nthat Pretoria has at its disposal”. (Financial\nTimes<\/em>, 30 October 1986). This ‘declaration of war’ would be a joke were it\nnot for South Africa’s backing and the frequent MNR attacks on the Beira line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Facts of SA power<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The South African generals have the\npower to cripple the Beira line at almost any time if they feel decisive action\nis needed. These are the facts of South African power, and Zimbabwean and Mozambican\nworkers and peasants can put no trust in the tactical divisions between Western\nimperialism and the Botha regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An effective defence against\nSouth African aggression, which the workers and youth are striving towards,\ndemands new methods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zimbabwean youth and workers in\nthe townships, factories, schools, villages, mines, and farms, should be armed\nto repel any South African incursion. This would also free larger sections of\nthe army to engage against the South African sponsored MNR and defend the Mozambican\nrevolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the ultimate guarantee of\nsuccess against the counter-revolution is not by military means alone. What is\nneeded is the elimination of the breeding grounds of support for, or passive\nsubmission to, the MNR\u2014in the starvation and destitution of the Mozambican\npeasantry which has yet to experience the benefits of the state control of the\neconomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Zimbabwe is in an excellent\nposition to repay the debts of gratitude incurred during the liberation\nstruggle. The granaries are full to overflowing with maize which is desperately\nneeded in Mozambique. Industry could be turned around to process raw materials\nfrom Mozambique. The textile industry in Zimbabwe, for example, has the\ncapacity to clothe the whole population of Southern Africa apart from South\nAfrica. Simple spare parts and consumer goods could be supplied on a\ncooperative basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the productive forces in\nZimbabwe can only be directed to the social and military tasks of defence\nagainst counter-revolution if the capitalist grip on the banks, monopolies, and\nfarms is broken and industry reorganised by the workers and peasants on the\nbasis of a national and regional plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Socialist Federation of\nZimbabwe and Mozambique, in short, is the only effective answer to counter-revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Political direction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n These fundamental tasks of the\nSouthern African revolution raise the question of which direction the Mugabe\ngovernment is taking. As explained in the document, the most productive land is\nstill in the hands of white capitalist farmers, and the ownership of the factories\nand mines by the monopolies remains unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although there is a black\ngovernment and civil service, this state fundamentally defends capitalist\ninterests against the demands for change by the workers, peasants, and youth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n None of the tasks of the\nZimbabwean revolution have been carried through to completion on the basis of\ncapitalism. Although white minority rule has been ended, what democratic freedoms\nwere achieved after independence are now under threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the leadership does\neverything in its power to deny the reality that the capitalists dictate their\npolicies. All the policies of the Mugabe government, including (for example)\ncuts in the state budget, are carried out in the name of socialism! But calling\ncapitalist policies \u201csocialist” does not solve the problems of the masses.\nRather, it ends up discrediting socialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A large state bureaucracy is\ngrowing in Zimbabwe which extols the virtues of Stalinist regimes such as the\nUSSR, China, Eastern Europe and North Korea. What in reality they admire in these\nregimes is the privileged life-style of the ruling bureaucracies which have a\nbasis of ability unmatched in the crisis-ridden capitalist countries especially\nof the ‘Third World’. That ‘stability’ has been established on the advantages\nof state ownership and economic planning, and is maintained through so-called\n“Marxist-Leninist” party apparatuses\u2014which rule by totalitarian\nmethods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Zimbabwe, the \u2018socialist\u2019\nbureaucracy models ZANU(PF) in this way in order to maintain its privilege, not\non the basis of the state ownership and planning of the economy, but by\ndefending capitalism!<\/p>\n\n\n\n This leads to bizarre contradictions.\nThus, although both ZANU(PF) and ZAPU have declared their parties\n“Marxist-Leninist”, one of the ZANU(PF) leaders, Nkala, recently\nadmitted that “debate is in full blast within ZANU(PF) whether or not\nsocialism is the best ideological path for Zimbabwe”. (Prize Africa<\/em>, December 1985)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of the contradiction\nbetween \u2018socialist\u2019 policies and capitalist reality we have a\n“Marxist-Leninist” party which is not sure whether it is committed to\nsocialism! This means that at least a section of the bureaucracy favours openly\nabandoning even the pretense of \u2018socialism\u2019, in order the better to get on with\nenriching itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These glaring contradictions\nproduce doubts and scepticism in the minds of the masses and a growing political\ncrisis within the leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Developments on the lines are\npredicted in the document. However, it even understated the absurdity with\nwhich they are working themselves out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Adopted capitalism”<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In June this year, one of the top\nleaders of ZANU(PF), Maurice Nyagumbo, was forced to admit that Zimbabwe did\nnot have a socialist government \u201cas we now appear to have adopted capitalism,\nbecome property owners, and appear to be deceiving our people.” (Guardian<\/em>, 7 June 1986)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Admitting that he had bought a\nlarge farm after independence, but had recently soId it, he even proposed that\nthere should be an emergency conference of ZANU(PF) at which the rank and file\nshould decide whether to replace the leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nyagumbo did not, however, reveal\nwhat he had done with the proceeds from the sale of his farm. Moreover, such\nare the doubts about the leaders that the workers and youth were not at all\nsurprised to hear nothing more about his astonishing proposal for a conference!<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather than representing the\nemergence of a serious socialist left-wing, such outbursts have everything to\ndo with bureaucratic rivalry. Hardly beneath the surface, as the document\npoints out, are the struggles between the different Shona regional overlords in\nZANU(PF).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Less than two months before the\n‘admission of guilt’ by Mugabe’ s favourite, this wag confirmed when the\nregional and tribal tensions within ZANU(PF) exploded in parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ushewokunze, then Minister of\nTransport and political commissar of ZANU(PF), responded to criticisms of his\npolitical and business dealings by launching a diatribe against his political\nenemies within the party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the past identified as a\n\u2018left\u2019 and calling for the formation of Marxist study circles, this leader now\naccused the Shona Karanga clan of planning to “pounce on me and kill\nme”, just as (he alleged) they had killed Chitepo, a leader of the\nguerrilla struggle. The Karangas considered him “a spanner in the works in\ntheir jockeying for tribal political control” and had constantly plotted\nhis downfall, he said. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The filth of nepotism,\ncorruption, and mismanagement in the ZANU(PF) government revealed by both sides\nin the affair brought disgrace to the leadership as a whole. For a time the\ngovernment was virtually paralysed by the sordid controversy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Faced with this, Mugabe has\nsought to maintain his reputation by levering himself above the daily cut and\nthrust of politics. He increasingly projects himself as a world statesman\nconcerned with the leadership of the Third World and its diplomatic manoeuvres against\napartheid South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The ZANU(PF)-ZAPU deal<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The crisis of leadership has\nraised continual questions over the fate of the protracted unity talks between\nthe ZANU(PF) and ZAPU leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If agreement depended on the\ndesires and ideas of the leadership, no deal would have been possible. The\nattitude of the ZANU(PF) leadership was shown in the statement of Ushewokunze,\n“We believe that everything is right in ZANU(PF) and, therefore, we see no\nneed for concessions, compromise, and accommodation.” (Sunday Mail<\/em>, 19 January 1986)<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other side the ZAPU\nleaders, rather than fighting for socialist policies in a unified party, see\nthe question as merely one of the \u2018rightful role\u2019 of Father Zimbabwe (Nkomo)\nand themselves in the privileged bureaucracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The deal has succeeded not\nbecause of what the politicians wanted, but because they have no alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is reported, for example, that\nMnangagwa, the security minister in charge of the CIO, has been the leading\nadvocate of the deal (behind closed doors, of course) after his eyes had been\nopened to the devastation of Mozambique by the South African-backed MNR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the Guardian<\/em> correspondent commented: “A continuation of\nZimbabwe’s tragic divisions would only give South Africa on a silver platter a\nready-made dissident group with an ethnic base.” (17 April 1986)<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is this, and ZAPU\u2019s retention\nof support in Matabeleland in the 1985 elections, which has advanced the\ndiscussions. As the document argues, Zimbabwean military involvement in\nMozambique will become ever more demanding, making military suppression of Matabeleland\nan unattractive option for Mugabe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet the deal will have to be a\nvery poor thing, based on the division of party and government positions,\nrather than a determination to unite. While the ZAPU leadership is trying to\nlet \u2018bygones be bygones\u2019 as they seek positions, the evidence of joint ZANU(PF)\/ZAPU\nrallies shows that the Ndebele peasants want a real change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At a rally earlier this year,\nNkala, the former tormentor of Nkomo, was interrupted by the audience of Ndebele\npeasants who demanded that troops should be withdrawn from their area. (Prize Africa<\/em>, May 1986)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Problems such as these will\nsurface again and again even after the details of the unity deal are spelt out.\nThousands of Ndebele workers, youth, and peasants, have been killed during the military\nrepression since 1982.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the future both party leaders\nwill try to draw a curtain over the terrible facts of repression. As in the\ncase of the bloody military dictatorships of Latin America, the ZANU(PF) leaders\nwill argue they had to fight a ‘dirty war’ against terrorism and that any\nmethods were justified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But they had to undertake the\nbloody repression of Matabeleland because they were not prepared to undertake a\nsocialist campaign to transform Zimbabwean society which would have undercut\nthe dissidents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the price for their positions\nin government, the ZAPU leaders will remain silent on the torture and murders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the facts were known to the\nShona workers and peasants\u2014and if the revolutionary socialist alternative were\nunderstood\u2014the government’s repression would be regarded as a national disgrace\nand a matter for deep shame.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But with the first flush of\nenthusiasm for the deal these issues will be side-stepped as both Shona and\nNdebele workers and peasants welcome the easing of pressures to divide on\ntribal-national lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Previously Marxists had to argue\nthat a deal was possible despite the lack of will by the petty bourgeois politicians.\nNow the opposite side of the coin will have to be stressed: that on the basis\nof capitalism the tribal-national divisions will open up with greater force in\nthe future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Genuine socialists will seize the\nopportunity of the pause in tribal-national chauvinism to raise the question of\nworkers’ unity against the capitalists. It is vital that both Shona and Ndebele\nworkers use this opportunity to initiate steps to develop class unity across\nregional divisions in the workplace and township.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These tasks can only be carried out\nif the workers unite to build the trade unions, independent of state control,\nagainst the policies of compromise and collaboration with capitalism of the\nbureaucracy in the trade unions and party, and give voice to the ideas of\ngenuine socialism in the party as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic prospects<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The document argues that the\neconomic upturn of 1984-85 would peak in 1986 and then an economic decline\nwould set in basically because of the shortage of foreign exchange.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This has now been confirmed. The\nmost recent report of the Standard Bank (September 1986) talks of “formidable\nchallenges over the next 18 months” during which adverse factors would predominate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 5-year development plan\nannounced in April takes no account of the prevailing crisis in world\ncapitalism, and the accumulating factors which will almost certainly produce a\nnew recession or slump internationally, with serious consequences for Zimbabwe,\nin the period covered by the plan. Its targets, based on continued steady\ngrowth, cannot be taken seriously. The overall method of the plan is thoroughly\ndishonest\u2014there is no balance sheet drawn up to compare what was targeted and\nwhat was achieved in the previous 3-year plan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In all the key questions of\neconomic and social life, in employment, housing, land resettlement,\ninvestment, etc, the targets of the first plan were sabotaged by the capitalists’\ncommand of the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In agriculture, for example,\nbetween 1980-85 there has been a decline<\/strong>\nof 7% in employment (100,000 jobs) despite the value of output rising by at\nleast 50% over the same period. (Zimbabwe\nNews<\/em>, June 1985) While brick and other building material workers were\nretrenched, only 13,500 out of 115,000 houses targeted were built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What progress was made was\nachieved at the expense of rising inflation and growing debts to local and\ninternational capitalists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Increasingly Zimbabwe also faces\nthe spillover effects of the general uncertainty of the capitalists in South\nAfrica.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The economy is not only adversely\naffected by local factors, but increasingly hemmed in by the world market. Even\nin the course of the recent upturn in the US economy world commodity prices\nfell dramatically. With recession in the US, they will be likely to fall\nfurther.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In many countries of the under-developed\nworld the costs of producing primary commodities are now well above the world\nprices particularly in sugar and tin, even though starvation wages are paid to\nthe workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These factors apply equally to\nZimbabwe and will tend to pull the economy into decline even if there is\nreasonable rainfall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The coming of a world slump will\ndevastate the economies of the former colonial countries and face the political\nleaders of these countries with the prospect either of watching whole industries\ndisappearing or being forced to take emergency measures to bring the productive\nforces under state ownership. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The socialist opposition in the\nworkers’ committees, trade unions, and party, face the challenge of preparing\nthe workers and youth for these developments. Faced by such a crisis the\nworking class will have to fight against all the gains of the past being\nremoved, and will have to win the support of the peasants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But for the working class to\nsucceed a clear program showing the way forward is necessary. The Marxists will\nhave to show how the crisis can only be overcome by the completion of that revolution;\nby the working class placing itself at the head of the nation against imperialism;\nby overthrowing capitalism and securing a democratic workers’ state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This would then open the way to a\nplan of production, the expansion of manufacturing, and the real development of\nthe country with an economy geared to the people’s needs, not profit. But\nwithin the national boundaries of Zimbabwe the limits of even this achievement\nwould soon be clear\u2014the revolution would have to spread for the gains to be\ncontinued and for a socialist society to be constructed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Workers’ power in Zimbabwe would\nbe a beacon to the workers and peasants of Africa struggling under the\none-party dictatorships of capitalism. It would hasten the workers’ revolution\nin South Africa\u2014the only sure defence of a democratic workers’ state in\nZimbabwe from counter-revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Workers’ democratic rule\nthroughout Southern Africa would point the way forward to genuine regional\ncooperation, developing agriculture and industry, eliminating poverty, and\nlaying the foundations for socialism. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 10 December 1986<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nContinue to Chapter One<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"