{"id":303,"date":"2019-08-27T14:44:00","date_gmt":"2019-08-27T12:44:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marxistworkersparty.org.za\/?page_id=303"},"modified":"2019-12-06T21:06:41","modified_gmt":"2019-12-06T19:06:41","slug":"armed-struggle-and-workers-power","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/?page_id=303","title":{"rendered":"Armed Struggle and Workers\u2019 Power"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Originally published in Inqaba Ya Basebenzi No. 7 (August 1982)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

by D. Sikhakhane and D. Hugo<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the present\nperiod, the struggle for power between the forces of capitalism and the forces\nof the working class is opening up in countries around the world. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In South Africa\nover the last decade, the workers and youth have surged forward in wave after wave,\nonly to find themselves confronted with the guns of the police. Many hundreds\nhave fallen victim to the regime. Since well before Sharpeville it has become\nclear to many workers that there is no peaceful way of removing the apartheid\nregime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After Sharpeville\nthere was a massive, spontaneous strain towards the use of armed force against\nthe state which induced the leaders of the ANC and the SA Communist Party to\nabandon their policy of non-violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marxism has\nalways combatted the illusion that the ruling class can be persuaded to\npeacefully surrender its power. Violence is daily used by ruling classes\nagainst the oppressed, in countries throughout the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The state power\nof the capitalists depends on armed bodies of men \u2013 the army, police, etc. \u2013 defending\ntheir privately-owned factories, mines, banks and land against the workers’\nstruggle to take over that property in order to organise production for the common\nbenefit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Every struggle should therefore be approached as a\nstep towards building the organised strength of the workers for the ultimate\nexertion \u2013 the seizure of power and the total destruction of the capitalist\nstate. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Guerrillas<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the wake of\nthe Durban strikes and the Soweto uprising there has been a re-emergence of\nactions by ANC guerrillas. In the past year there has been a 200% increase in\nthe number of attacks. In June 1982 alone, nine attacks were reported in virtually\nall centres of SA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is\nwidespread sympathy and support for the guerrillas. But despite their bravery\nand their determination to fight the regime, guerrillas are no answer to the\nneed to protect the mass movement against police attacks, to prevent arrests or\nkillings, to free political prisoners and drive back the forces of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most serious\ncrisis for the whole strategy of guerrilla struggle arose with the struggles in\nSoweto. The massacre of schoolchildren provoked calls among wide sections of\nthe youth and workers for the means of armed resistance against the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it was\nunprepared and unarmed that they were obliged to confront the forces of the\nstate. Again in Cape Town in 1980 the youth died with sticks and stones in\ntheir hands, without means or training to defend themselves. Most recently in\nJuly 1982, black miners found themselves defenceless against the guns of the\npolice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clearly, the\nquestion of how<\/strong> to build the armed\nforce capable of defending our struggle, of defeating the regime and placing\nthe working people in control of society has still to be resolved in our\nmovement \u2013 over twenty years after the turn to \u2018armed struggle\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Rural struggle<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the Morogoro\nconference in 1969, the ANC leaders in exile declared that “general\nstrikes as a method of mobilisation, suppressed with the utmost vigour at the\nend of the fifties, could no longer be effectively employed as an instrument of\nmass struggle” (Strategy and Tactics\nof the ANC<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The struggle,\nthey went on to say, should be fought as a “guerrilla struggle”,\ninitially “outside the enemy’s stronghold in the cities, in the vast\nstretches of our countryside” (though, it was added, “guerrilla\nactivity in the urban areas of a special type is always important as an\nauxiliary”).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Central\nCommittee of the SACP in 1970 pledged “unqualified support for the\nliberation army in its aim to recruit and train guerrilla fighters, to spread\nthe area of guerrilla war to the heart of the Republic” (A. Lerumo, Fifty Fighting Years<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the\nperspective of rural guerrilla war spreading to the cities has failed to\nmaterialise. In fact, the social\nconditions for a struggle of this nature are completely absent in SA.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In countries\nsuch as China, Vietnam, Mozambique and Angola, the victories of the heroic guerrilla\narmies were the result of specific conditions created by an extremely low level\nof capitalist development and, internationally, by the relative weakness of\nimperialism since the Second World War.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The class basis\nfor guerrilla armies has always been the peasantry. With the capitalists a puny\nforce, a mere pawn of imperialism and incapable of developing the economy; with\nthe working class correspondingly small; and with the state apparatus weak and\nunstable, the armed peasant masses have been able to defeat the regimes of the\ncapitalists and landlords.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(However, in the\nabsence of a Marxist leadership of the working class with a programme for\nworkers’ democracy, power fell into the hands of the leadership of the guerrilla\narmies, giving rise to bureaucratically deformed states. These questions are\ndiscussed more fully in Inqaba<\/em> no.\n5.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In comparison\nwith these countries, SA has undergone a powerful development on a capitalist\nbasis. Massive foreign investment, and the growth of a national bourgeoisie,\nhave built up an industrialised economy and called into existence a powerful\nworking class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling class\nhas been able to develop mass support among the white middle class and workers.\nOut of white conscripts they have built a military machine equipped with the\nmost deadly weapons, which is comparable in its ruthless ferocity to the\nIsraeli army in Lebanon. This is in sharp contrast to former colonial countries\nwhere guerrilla forces have been able to wear down and defeat unstable, weak\nregimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Capitalism in SA\nhas also transformed the countryside. The bulk of agricultural production is in\nthe hands of big capitalist farmers and even international monopolies. A\npeasantry, to the extent that it ever existed, has largely disappeared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rural areas\nare inhabited by agricultural workers and impoverished masses whose liberation\ndepends on the expropriation of urban industry and mining, as well as the huge\nagricultural enterprises, in order to replace capitalist ownership with\ndemocratic working-class control and management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus in SA the\nfuture of the whole population lies in the urban centres. The cities are not\nonly the capitalists’ stronghold but are also the central battleground in the\nliberation struggle. Society is polarised between the capitalist class, relying\non the guns of the state, and the mass force of the working class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only the working class is able to defeat the regime,\nto smash the capitalist system and thereby to liberate all the oppressed. <\/strong>All other sections of people in struggle must throw in their lot\nwith the workers’ movement to ensure the enemy’s defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As this has\nbecome more and more clearly understood in the ranks of the working class, the\nyouth and all militants, renewed debates have opened up as to when, where and\nhow to use arms in the battles that lie ahead. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Urban targets<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unable to base\nthemselves in the countryside, the guerrillas \u2013 drawn by the magnetic power of\nthe workers’ renewed upsurge \u2013 have turned increasingly towards urban and\nindustrial targets. This becomes clearer if we look at the guerrilla actions\ncarried out last year (this breakdown is based on press reports and is not\nnecessarily complete): <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bomb attacks 21<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

  • electricity installations 6<\/li>
  • railway lines 5<\/li>
  • government offices 5<\/li>
  • business property 3<\/li>
  • other 2<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n

    Shooting attacks 8<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    • police stations 6<\/li>
    • military base 1<\/li>
    • individuals (C. Sebe) 1<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n

      These actions,\ninvolving great personal danger, show a high degree of courage and commitment\non the part of the guerrillas. Even so, the sum total of what was achieved in\nthe course of a year’s struggle, measured in terms of damage suffered by the\nregime, is minimal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The intended\nstrategy has been to strike at the material resources of the regime and bring\nabout a breakdown of the system. But SA’s developed economy has been able to\nabsorb the destruction of facilities, and replace them, on a much greater scale\nthan the guerrillas have been able to inflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The damage to\nrailway lines etc. can be repaired sometimes within hours. Even the spectacular\nSasol bombing in 1980 meant no serious setback for the ruling class. The production\nof oil from coal has continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Even the bold\nassaults on police stations (totalling 12 between October 1976 and December\n1981) have been little more than symbolic challenges to the authority of the\nstate. There is no prospect of seriously weakening the regime’s armed power by\nthis means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      On the contrary,\nit is the guerrillas, with their small numbers and limited resources, who would\nrisk being weakened and ultimately destroyed in a drawn-out military struggle\nagainst the police and army. This has been the fate, for example, of the ERP in\nArgentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      <\/div>\n\n\n\n

      Limitations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The limitations\nof the current armed actions were recognised by the ANC President, Comrade\nTambo, in his recent statement in Zimbabwe that “sabotage attacks alone\nwould not bring South Africa to its knees” (reported in the Herald<\/em>, 21 June). Less clear, however,\nwas the alternative he put forward: “We are moving from sabotage acts to attack\nthe enemy face to face”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Does this mean a\nserious offensive by MK against the SADF? If so, MK would find itself isolated\nand outnumbered by enemy forces with an overwhelming superiority in terms of\nweapons, equipment and morale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The mass of the\nworkers would be overwhelmingly sympathetic to the guerrillas. But the workers’\nmovement, greatly matured after ten years of struggles, will not easily commit\nitself to bloody battles led from outside its own ranks, with no control over\nits programme and no clarity as to where it will lead. There can be no prospect\nof military victory under these conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      More likely,\nComrade Tambo meant a stepping up of sporadic raids on police stations,\nmilitary installations etc. But such attacks would amount to no more than\npin-pricks against the regime (a point conceded by Comrade Nzo,\nSecretary-General of the ANC, in a TV interview in Britain) which would goad it\nto greater fury and rally the forces of white reaction, while the decisive\nstruggles are fought out in the factories and mines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      A hint of the\nreal implications of increased guerrilla attacks has been given by ANC leaders\nwho have pointed at the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as an example of the\nmurderous reprisals the SA regime would be capable of launching against the\ncountries where the guerrillas are based.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The crushing defeat of the PLO and the savage\nslaughter of Lebanese civilians should stand as a tragic monument to the\nconsequences of trying to fight a guerrilla war under conditions where no basis\nexists for its success.<\/strong> For the masses of Southern\nAfrica, the military programme of the ANC leadership holds out the deadly\ndanger of turning the region into a new and bloodier Middle East. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The writing is\nalready on the wall \u2013 Kassinga; Matola; Chimoio; the assassination of more and\nmore activists in neighbouring countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The conclusion\nneeds to be clearly drawn: to launch armed attacks against the regime at a stage when the workers’ movement has\nnot yet decisively weakened its social and material base<\/strong> is to challenge the\nenemy at his strongest point \u2013 which is also, at this stage, the weakest<\/strong> point of our own movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The ANC\nleadership itself has correctly recognised that “to ignore the real\nsituation and to play about with imaginary forces, concepts and ideals is to\ninvite failure. The art of revolutionary leadership consists in providing\nleadership to the masses and not just to its most advanced elements …\nUntimely, ill planned or premature manifestations of violence impede and do not\nadvance the prospect of revolutionary change…” (Strategy and Tactics<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      These remarks\nalso sum up the weaknesses of the guerrilla strategy in SA, and identify the\nmistakes which the workers’ movement must avoid in preparing for the armed\nstruggle that will be capable of smashing the regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      <\/div>\n\n\n\n

      Mobilisation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The central task\nin SA is the mobilisation of the workers’ movement to end apartheid, abolish\ncapitalism and carry through the socialist transformation of society. Urban guerrilla\naction, by its very nature, can provide no basis whatsoever for carrying\nforward this struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This has been\nimplicitly recognised in Strategy and\nTactics<\/em>: “when armed actions begin they seldom involve more than a\ncomparative handful of combatants whose very conditions of fighting-existence\nmake them incapable of exercising the functions of all-round political\nleadership”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Twenty years\nafter the founding of MK, armed actions have not yet progressed very much\nbeyond this \u2018beginning\u2019 stage. Nevertheless, proponents of guerrilla war\ncontinue to argue that the guerrillas\u2019 isolated mode of operation \u2013 which is\ninevitable under the conditions of a powerful police state \u2013 is only temporary.\nIncreasingly, they believe, the masses will be mobilised and turn the scales against\nthe forces of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      These arguments,\nbased on the experience of peasant wars, are dangerously misleading in the\ncontext of an industrialised country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The guerrillas\nmay attempt in every way possible to link up with the workers. In some cases \u2013 e.g.\nthe bombing of Leyland showrooms during the Leyland workers’ strike \u2013 the\nintention was clearly to support the workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Similarly,\nblowing up the Soweto railway line can prevent workers from going to work; and\nbombing the Rosslyn electricity sub-station can shut down factories in the\narea, thus bringing about a ‘strike’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      But the method of guerrilla struggle cannot serve to\nmobilise the mass of workers.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      On the contrary\n\u2013 if the Leyland bosses can be forced to make concessions by a bomb placed in\ntheir building by a single activist, why should the workers have to organise\nand strike? If a stay-away can be \u2018organised\u2019 by placing explosives on a\nrailway line, what need is there for political leadership to unite the workers\nbehind a programme of action?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      But in reality, no armed individual or group of\nindividuals can take the place of the collective organisation and power of the\nworkers as a class in the struggle to defeat the apartheid regime and replace\nit with a system of workers’ democracy.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The guerrilla\nmethod cannot contribute to the building of a revolutionary leadership among\nthe workers and youth. In fact, more often it has the opposite effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This applies\nvery clearly at the level of human resources. Thousands of the bravest and most\ndedicated youth, recruited for military training abroad, are in practice unable\nto return. Confined to military camps, they have been effectively removed from\nthe struggle on the ground and are even prevented from supporting the workers’\nstruggle actively in exile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      For those who\nreturn on missions, the rate of casualties is high, not only to themselves but\nto the movement as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Every guerrilla\naction is followed by intense police reaction, roadblocks, house to house\nsearches, detentions of known activists, etc. Solomon Mahlangu became the first\nfreedom fighter to die at the hands of the apartheid hangman since the early\n1960s. There can be no doubt that in\nfuture the regime’s reaction will harden, with a spiralling increase of hangings\nand long-term imprisonment.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      At the same\ntime, the regime’s vicious weapons for smashing guerrilla action are pointed\nagainst the movement as a whole. Measures such as the ‘Sabotage Act’ and the\nTerrorism Act were originally intended for crushing armed insurgency. But in\npractice they have been used against all<\/strong>\nopponents of the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Thus conditions\nhave been created for even more vicious attacks against the movement of the\nworkers, which have only been held at bay by the strength and militancy of the\nworkers’ organisations themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Conversely, the\nregime’s own support among the whites has undoubtedly been strengthened by what\nis seen as ‘external attack’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Bombings, raids\non police stations, etc., point out no alternative to the present system. Their main effect is to harden white\nreaction and divide the working class still further.<\/strong> This prepares the\nground for the militarisation of white youth, and to divert attention of the\nwhites from the hopeless failures of state policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Carried to their\nlogical conclusion, these methods would serve to confront the working class\nwith a united enemy, with armed forces hundreds of thousands strong, which\ncould only be defeated at the cost of a bloodbath that would leave the\nrevolution nothing to inherit except the smouldering ruins of the cities and\nthe farms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      All these aspects have to be taken into account in\ndrawing up a sober balance sheet of the gains and losses of twenty years of\nguerrilla struggle.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      There remains only one force potentially strong enough\nto liberate SA: the revolutionary movement of the working class. It is that\nforce which must be built and armed. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      <\/div>\n\n\n\n

      Armed mass insurrection<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Armed struggle\naimed at the taking of state power cannot take place separately from the mass\nmovement of the workers. The power of the capitalists can only be dismantled by\nthe organised power of the workers, linking the day-to-day struggles to the\norganised seizure of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The need for the workers to develop the means of armed\nstruggle is experienced by the workers themselves through their confrontation\nwith the armed forces of the state.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The armed police\nat the factory gate, driving away striking workers and letting the\nstrike-breakers through; the baton charge which breaks up a mass meeting \u2013 it\nis these turns in events which lay down the limits of unarmed struggle and make\nit clear that to carry the struggle further, it is necessary to beat back the\nforces of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      But simply putting rifles into workers’ hands, or\norganising guerrilla support, will not solve the problem.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Any use of arms\nby the oppressed inevitably triggers off the most vicious state reaction. To\nseriously put up armed resistance, the workers’ movement must be able to\nwithstand the attacks that will follow and sustain the struggle at a higher,\nmore intense level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      For this, a\nmassive degree of organisation and unity will be essential \u2013 trade unions able\nto unite the key sections of workers in action on a country-wide scale; and\npolitical leadership able to coordinate the struggle as a whole, open and underground,\narmed and unarmed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Such a\nleadership can only be developed out of the ranks of the oppressed working\nclass itself, and can play an effective role only to the extent that it remains\nrooted among the active sections of the workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Therefore it is necessary to build the ANC not for the\npurpose of recruiting youth for guerrilla training, but to engage in the mass\nstruggle of the workers and provide a revolutionary lead.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      We must build\nbranches of the ANC (initially as an underground network) in every factory,\nmine and township and link them together regionally and nationally. We must\nmobilise in every district on the basis of the workers’ most pressing demands,\nand link these to the struggle for power. We must fight for trade union unity\nas the backbone of working-class power, and link the trade unions of the\nworkers with the workers’ ANC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In the course of\nthis struggle all questions of policy, strategy and tactics, including the\nquestion of armed struggle, have to be addressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In the early\nstages armed struggle is likely to have the character of armed self-defence<\/strong> against the terror tactics of the state. But as\nthe masses gain strength, confidence and skills, and as the camp of the enemy\ngets divided, the basis will be laid for passing over onto the offensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Only armed\ndetachments of workers, feeling the support of thousands of toilers behind\nthem, can successfully prevail against all the pressures of the state, the\nruling class and the agents of capitalism warning against ‘going too far’.\nThese detachments would be able to protect the picket lines outside factories\non strike, the homes of people threatened with eviction, mass meetings, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      <\/div>\n\n\n\n

      How will the workers’ movement become armed? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In SA there is\nno shortage of weapons. A workers’ ANC, based in every district, would find the\nways of transferring these into the workers’ hands and teaching workers how to\nuse them, as and when this becomes possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      An important\npart will undoubtedly be played by those comrades who have already received\nmilitary training as guerrillas. Once they become fully involved in the\nday-to-day struggles of the masses, they will be able to assist in the training\nand arming of the movement. The supplies of weapons which they have brought\ninto the country can then be used for this purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      What will be\ndecisive, however, will be the development of the ANC as a revolutionary mass\norganisation putting forward a clear programme for the dismantling of\napartheid, the smashing of capitalism and the socialist transformation of society.\nWhile rallying the overwhelming mass of the oppressed, such a programme can\nalso present an alternative to the most advanced sections of white workers,\nthus beginning to drive a wedge into the social basis on which the regime\ndepends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      No one must\nunderestimate the difficulties which this process will involve, or the patience\nand firmness with which black workers will need to explain the advantages of a\nrevolutionary workers’ South Africa to those among their white fellow-workers\nwho are prepared to listen. The alternative, however, is to prepare for racial\ncivil war that would devastate the country and inflict a terrible toll on our\nmovement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Even sections of\nthe existing police and armed force, not only blacks but also some whites \u2013\nespecially conscripts \u2013 could be won to the side of the workers’ movement on\nthe basis of a genuine socialist programme. They could bring with them not only\ntheir own guns but also the keys to the armouries of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Correctly, an\nANC statement on 16 June encouraged young whites who find themselves in the\nSADF to form clandestine groups and start operations against the government. But such a call could only be heeded by\nsignificant numbers of soldiers if it is linked to a programme for the complete\ntransformation of society and the establishment of workers’ democracy, in which\nworking-class whites could recognise their interest.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The weakening\nand division of the capitalists’ white support; the power, unity and\ndetermination of the workers’ mass movement; the clarity of the revolutionary\nleadership provided by the ANC \u2013 these are the basic elements that will\ndetermine the ripening of a revolutionary situation in SA. When that situation\narises the armed insurrection of the oppressed masses, under the leadership of\nthe working class, will be on the agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Under these\nconditions the armed workers will be able to take by storm, disarm, and conquer\nthe armed forces of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The capacity of\nthe working class to do this was shown by the Paris workers in 1871, the\nRussian workers in 1917, the Spanish workers in 1936, the Iranian workers in\n1979, etc. These revolutions \u2013 their victories and defeats \u2013 should be\ncarefully studied today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The task of all comrades is to help prepare our movement for the battles that face us by building the ANC and the trade unions, and explaining the need for a socialist programme that can show the way to national and social liberation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Continue to Part Three<\/a><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Originally published in Inqaba Ya Basebenzi No. 7 (August 1982) by D. Sikhakhane and D. Hugo In the present period, the struggle for power between […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":780,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-303","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"aioseo_notices":[],"acf":[],"_hostinger_reach_plugin_has_subscription_block":false,"_hostinger_reach_plugin_is_elementor":false,"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/303","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=303"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/303\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":993,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/303\/revisions\/993"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/780"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=303"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}