{"id":1049,"date":"2019-12-11T18:23:21","date_gmt":"2019-12-11T16:23:21","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marxistworkersparty.org.za\/?page_id=1049"},"modified":"2021-04-13T10:11:05","modified_gmt":"2021-04-13T08:11:05","slug":"the-revolutionary-upsurge-of-1984-85","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/?page_id=1049","title":{"rendered":"The Revolutionary Upsurge of 1984-85"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Originally appeared in Inqaba Ya Basebenzi No. 18-19\n(February 1986) under the pen name Basil Hendrickse<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

by Weizmann Hamilton<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the preface to his masterly History of the Russian Revolution<\/em> Trotsky wrote,<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the intervention of the masses in historic events. In ordinary times …  history is made by specialists in that line of business \u2013 kings, ministers, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, journalists. But at those crucial moments when the old order becomes no longer endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the initial groundwork for the new regime… The history of revolution is … first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own destiny.<\/strong><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The events of 1984-85 have not been, in the full\nsense, a revolution: the apartheid regime, though shaken, remains essentially\nintact. Yet a revolution there has been \u2013 measured in the scale and intensity of\nthe movement of black working people. In the consciousness of the black youth\nand massive sections of black workers, the South African revolution has begun.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The movement of 1984-85 has been characterised above all by the absolutely heroic role of the youth. Arrested, tortured, maimed and murdered in the most cowardly fashion by police and troops on the streets during the day, and by hyenas concealing their faces in balaclavas at night, the youth gave to the UN-declared ‘International Year of the Youth’ a meaning this impotent body never intended. They achieved in action in eighteen months what decades of resolutions declaring apartheid a crime against humanity could never do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paradoxically, it\nis the attacks of the state which forced the youth more firmly and more consciously\ninto the leadership of the movement. The imprisonment of the national UDF\nleadership, far from halting the movement, brought to the forefront, from the ranks\nprincipally of the working class youth, fresh leadership. This leadership has\nshown itself far more militant and willing to engage the state in a head-on\nconfrontation and go to the end in this. For this reason, it has been far more\ncapable of awakening to political life the most downtrodden and, hitherto,\nleast politically conscious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling\nclass, in their own perverse and barbarous way, have recognised the central\nrevolutionary role of the youth. Youth have borne the brunt of brutal state\nrepression \u2013 approximately 80% of those detained, tortured and killed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the repression and the banning of Cosas, the youth remained undeterred. As one activist said, “ban or no ban, the struggle for a people’s democratic education is on. It will be on until our demands are met. And our demands go far beyond our classrooms. We will find a way. It is a matter of changing our tactics, of working out alternatives. Organisations, like leaders, come and go but the ideals and aspirations of the people remain.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Working Class Masses<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Spearheaded by\nthe working class youth, the struggles of 1984-85 have confirmed that the South\nAfrican revolution is and will be a movement of the working class masses<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In comparison with 1976 and even 1980, the level of co-operation in 1984-85 between youth and workers, and the identification of workers with the struggle of the school youth, has represented a qualitative leap forward. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Pietersburg in the Northern Transvaal to Atlantis in the Cape, the youth have carried the flag of organisation. By building not just youth organisations, but community organisations to draw in workers in the remotest towns, by actively campaigning against tribalism as well as recruiting for trade unions of which they themselves are not members \u2013 in short by building on the recognition of the decisive weight of the working class in the struggle in SA \u2013 the youth helped thousands of adult workers overcome the doubts which marked their attitude in 1976.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, so much has the whole black working class been infected by the revolutionary spirit of the youth that, as one student activist pointed out, \u201cWe have grannies and oupas flocking to us saying \u2018we want to be members of Cosas\u2019. We would have to tell them Cosas is for students.\u201d (“State of the Nation”, Saspu National<\/em>, Oct\/Nov 1985)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The basis for\nthis advance in working class unity lies above all in the social issues, which\nhave been to the fore like in no other struggle in South African history.\nCampaigning on the issues of high rents, bus and train fares, CST, etc., the\nyouth have instinctively used the method of the transitional programme\nexplained by Trotsky. They have campaigned on the basis of explaining that all\nthese vitally necessary struggles can be lastingly won only by uniting them into\nthe political battle for the socialist transformation of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Vaal\nTriangle, where the movement found its launching pad, more than 350,000 people\ncontinue to refuse to pay rent, despite threats and blackmail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The high point\nof co-operation between workers and youth was the successful two-day regional\ngeneral strike in the Transvaal in November 1984. Organised at the initiative\nof the youth \u2013 itself inspired by previous youth-initiated stay-sways on the\nEast Rand and in the Vaal Triangle \u2013 it drew the workers and the youth together\nin action as never before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is in action,\nor under the impact of great events, that the masses learn rapidly. In the last\neighteen months a colossal transformation in class consciousness has taken\nplace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Never before\nhave the enormous chasms which separate the classes in real life, penetrated so\ndeeply into the consciousness of the working class and, indeed, the rest of\nsociety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A survey by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry in conjunction with the institute for Black Research, revealed that no less than 77% of blacks favour socialism. Remarkably, this survey found support for socialism to be 70% even amongst Gatsha Buthelezi’s supporters despite Gatsha extolling capitalism as “the best economic system which man has ever devised”! (Weekly Mail<\/em>, 11-18\/10\/1985)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Troops<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Initially, the\nmovement gained momentum from the clashes with the state forces thrown against\nit. When troops were first sent into Sebokeng and other townships (as Inqaba<\/em> pointed out in a November 1984 Editorial\nBoard statement) this failed to intimidate the mass movement, but rather \u201cenabled\nthe embattled working class to take the measure of the state’s forces more\nprecisely\u201d, and thus \u201cto begin to evolve tactics and methods for coping with this\nnew stage.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The sense was\nthat far greater forces of the revolution were still to be mobilised and tested\nin action against the enemy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the face of\nthe most formidable clashes, the movement continued to spread and mount, and\nwas then sustained<\/strong> at a peak of\nintensity far longer, in fact, than even the most seasoned activists could have\nexpected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is a\ndecisive indicator that a revolutionary earthquake in the depths of society has\ntaken place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first task\ntaken up by the youth was to remove all points of support for the regime within\nthe black townships. What has been achieved in this respect is an important\nconquest for the movement. Of the 103 community councils planned by the regime,\nvery few are still functioning \u2013 the rest destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Paralysed<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than thirty\nblack policemen have been killed and hundreds driven out of the townships. The\nnetwork of informers which has had such a debilitating effect on the movement\nin the past has been virtually paralysed, and in many areas eliminated almost entirely.\nThis will save thousands of lives in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Eastern\nCape, where the movement has advanced furthest, there developed not only\ntemporary no-go areas for the state’s repressive forces, but even embryonic\nsoviets in the form of committees, elected on street and zone bases. Through\nthem, thousands could be summoned to meetings within hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At\ndemonstrations, at the funerals, the assembling of the people took on the\ncharacter of the massing of a proletarian army, its battalions running in formation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as the\nmovement systematically dealt with the first and simplest obstacles in its way,\nthe most formidable central task began to pose itself in starker terms: the state has to be smashed.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A movement of this scale and intensity would have proved\npowerful enough to bring down virtually any other regime. But not the South\nAfrican regime. In this fact all the problems of our revolution are knotted\ntogether.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the\nrevolutionary onslaught upon it, undoubtedly the government was shaken. But \u2013 though\nthe points of support upon which it relied within the black community were\nextensively crippled \u2013 the state remains essentially intact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The defeat of\nthe community councils, the inability of the state to collect rent: these\nrepresent the paralysis of only part of the administrative machinery of the\nstate, important though this is for displaying to the black working class what\npower lies in its hands, and important though this administrative machinery is\nfor maintaining the bosses’ rule, it does not go to the heart of the question\nof state power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The state, as\nEngels explained, is in its essence, armed bodies of men \u2013 primarily the army,\nbut also the police. It is upon this that, in the final analysis, the\ncapitalist class depends for the defence of their wealth, their property and\ntheir rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To sustain a\nreliable state machine, the ruling class depends on a base of support in\nsociety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this sense\nthe state in SA does not differ from any other capitalist state, including\nthose in the advanced capitalist countries which still conceal their armed\ndefence of the dictatorhip of the capitalist class behind the skirts of parliamentary\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What sets the\nstate in SA apart is the racist composition of its social base. It is a state not\nsimply of capitalist dictatorship, but of capitalism basing itself on white minority domination<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The armed bodies\nof men in the SADF \u2013 the main instrument for the defence of capitalism \u2013 are\noverwhelmingly white.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The police\nforces, though increasingly black in the make-up of their ranks, are largely\nofficered by whites and will remain under effective white control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Around this\napparatus of repression, the whole bureaucratic machinery of administrative\ncontrol is welded together as an instrument of white domination and capitalism\nintertwined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overwhelming\nmajority of whites of all classes<\/strong>\nregard this as their<\/strong> state \u2013 even\nthose dissatisfied with the present regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The whites may\nbe a minority, but they are a substantial minority of five million. So long as\nthe whites of different classes are cemented together in common allegiance to\nthe present state and system, they provide it with a strength and cohesion without\nparallel in any country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only this\nexplains why the regime has emerged essentially unscathed from the onslaught of\na movement which reached insurrectionary proportions in the black townships\nalmost country-wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only this\n(together with the fact that the movement remained unarmed<\/strong>) explains why the state has used only a fraction of the\npower at its disposal \u2013 why the ruling class has not considered it necessary\n(yet) to deploy tanks, or use helicopter gunships, or aircraft on bombing raids\nagainst the townships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Savagery<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nobody can have\nany illusions, after the display of state savagery in which babies and the old\nalike were killed without remorse, that the armed forces would use these\nmethods if called upon to. In 1922 the ruling class did not hesitate even to bomb\nwhite residential areas in suppressing an uprising by white workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course there\nis a whole complex of pressures, political and economic, nationally and\ninternationally, which deter the regime from resorting at this stage to\nmeasures of unrestrained civil war against the black working people. But we\nmust distinguish what is secondary from what is primary. Once the ‘chips are\ndown\u2019 \u2013 with a movement on twice or three times the scale of 1984-85 (which\nwill occur in future) \u2013 the level of state violence will escalate beyond\nanything yet imagined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling class\nhas held back so far \u2013 because the state has not yet been fundamentally challenged\nin its heartlands \u2013 the ‘white’ centres of industry, finance and power. In\nfact, at the first opportunity, once the movement appeared to be “under\ncontrol”, it has resumed its efforts at combining repression with\n“reforms”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the\ntownships, the people emerged on the whole the stronger out of the trial of\nstrength with the state. Yet for the state to be fundamentally challenged, the\nstruggle has to move beyond the townships. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

How to do this\neffectively became the central problem facing the activists \u2013 especially the\nyouth. For experience showed that whenever it was attempted to take the insurrectionary movement of the\ntownships<\/strong> beyond the confines of those areas, the balance of advantage swung in favour of the state<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was\ndemonstrated in the abortive march on Pollsmoor which was initiated (without\nprior consultation and discussion in the movement) by Allan Boesak. It was\ndemonstrated also in the efforts of some of the youth to take revenge for\npolice killings by entering white residential areas in order to “take the\nstruggle to the Boers”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The obvious\nimpotence of these ventures, the resulting backlash, and the dangers of demoralisation\nwithin the movement which they posed, drove many activists towards a more\ncareful assessment of the real relationship of forces still weighted in SA in\nfavour of the ruling class and state. What tasks had still to be tackled if the\nrelationship of forces was to be changed decisively in favour of the revolution?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Firstly, it is\nclear that even within the black townships (not to mention the rural areas)\nvast forces remain to be mobilised in the struggle. In 1984-85 the movement did\nnot yet become, in full measure<\/strong>, a\nmovement of the whole<\/strong> of the\noppressed people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What to many seems the continuing “invincibility” of the apartheid state, engenders passivity among wide \u2013 generally older \u2013 layers of the black population. That in turn makes it difficult to drive-out entirely from the townships all collaborators and conscious agents of the regime \u2013 and enables the regime more easily to re-establish some points of support and control within these areas whenever the movement loses momentum for a time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Policemen<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, for example, while many black policemen may not be able to live in the townships any longer, it is still the case that blacks constitute more than half the police force. There have not been resignations en masse<\/em><\/strong>. When that happens it will be a sign of a fundamental shift in the relation of forces taking place. Meanwhile the intention of the regime is to increase the numbers of police by 11,000.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ability of\nthe regime to make use of ‘vigilantes’ such as the ‘A-team’ and so-called ‘fathers’\nin the recent period against militants in the townships; the clashes stirred up\nalong tribal and racial lines between blacks in some areas; the remaining hold\nof Inkatha in large parts of KwaZulu\/Natal \u2013 these are indicators of the\norganisational and political<\/strong>\nconquests which our movement still has to make before a fully mobilised and\nunited struggle of all oppressed people can be concentrated against the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To defeat the state will require a far stronger, and\nfar better organised force than the movement has yet built.<\/strong> It will also require methods of struggle going beyond<\/strong> township-based insurrection \u2013 methods of struggle by which the full social and organised power of the\nblack working class<\/strong> can be engaged in action against the state and\ncapitalist class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the\ndefeat of the SA state, entrenched as it is with the support of the whites,\nwill depend not only on building the mass working class movement. A pre-condition\nfor the collapse of the SA state is the crumbling and disintegration of the\nruling class as a result of the deepening economic, political, and social\ncrisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This in turn\nwill sap the confidence of the ranks of the whites, opening-up confusion and\ndivision, weakening the state machinery itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The necessary\nconditions for this are being prepared in South Africa, through the whole\nprocess of unfolding shocks, struggles and crises. But it will require still a\nperiod of years for all these conditions to fully mature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The South\nAfrican revolution will not be won in a single head-on confrontation, however\nheroic, but through a series of explosive revolutionary movements, extending\nover five, ten, or possibly more years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inevitably the\nmovement will pass through tidal flows and ebbs \u2013 periods of gigantic advance\nfollowed by lulls and even phases of setback and partial defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is\naltogether in the nature of every great social revolution, and all the more so\nin South Africa, where such immense forces are pitted against each other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Momentum<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To sustain the momentum of the struggles of 1984-85 further, the masses would have had to feel there was the prospect of inflicting at least a wounding blow if not a crippling defeat upon the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the class\nstruggle, nothing remains static. The movement reached a situation of stalemate<\/strong> against the forces of the\nenemy \u2013 undefeated<\/strong>, yet unable to move forward in a decisive way<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, over a period, despite continuing explosions and confrontations, a turning-point has undoubtedly occurred.<\/strong> In the townships, the mood of the masses is no longer at the same pitch of white heat. On a national scale, in comparison with the high points, the movement has begun to ebb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The imposition\nof the State of Emergency, in itself, had no more immediate intimidatory effect\nthan did the introduction of troops into Sebokeng in October 1984. The mood of\nthe masses became, if anything, more defiant. Struggle spread uncontrolled to\nareas not covered by the State of Emergency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless the\ndeclaration of the State of Emergency did mark an important change in the\npolitical situation. It represented a clear declaration by Botha that the\nrevolutionary movement would be faced down with uncompromising state violence,\nand that further ruling class retreat or \u2018reform\u2019 would be postponed or\nrelegated to secondary importance until ‘law and order’ had been re-imposed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To the extent\nthat the fiasco of the new constitution, the successful boycott of the coloured\nand Indian parliamentary elections, and the various partial retreats by the\nregime on apartheid laws had given a signal of its weakness to the masses and\nso emboldened the movement and aroused new layers \u2013 Botha was now concerned above\nall to convince people of the formidable, entrenched strength of the state.\n‘There will be no pushover!’ That was his message \u2013 which was emphasised in the\nintransigent tone of his August speech in Durban, the ‘Trojan horse’ massacre\nin Athlone, and in a whole accumulation of brutal incidents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is the main\nhistorical accomplishment of the movement of 1984-85 that it has brought out so\nclearly in the consciousness of the\nmasses<\/strong> that the fundamental issue is no longer whether<\/strong> it is necessary<\/strong>\nto overthrow the state \u2013 but how to overthrow it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, precisely\nbecause the movement still lacks at the present time the necessary strength of organisation<\/strong>, clarity<\/strong> of revolutionary programme and\nstrategy, unity<\/strong> of forces, and firm revolutionary<\/strong> leadership at national\nlevel to carry out this task \u2013 precisely for this reason and by virtue of the\nstalemate of contending forces that set in, a turning-point<\/strong> was inevitable and has occurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The movement has\npassed the peak of the present revolutionary\nwave<\/strong>. This turning-point is not associated with any one particular event,\nbut with the cumulative effect of a series of events.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Recent Eruptions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This characterisation of the overall situation is not refuted by all the most recent eruptions: Mamelodi for example, or Alexandra.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where the masses have entered the arena of struggle later than in other parts, this reveals, on the one hand, the thoroughness of the historical process in preparing ever wider layers of society for participation in the revolution \u2013 and, on the other hand, the preparedness of wider layers to stand-up and be counted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time,\nactivists in many areas, reading the mood of the masses cooling around them,\nare continuing to engage in heroic clashes with the police \u2013 who are seizing every\nopportunity to crush them by beatings and massacres.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The phase of relative<\/strong> ebbing which has now begun will not at all be a period of tranquillity. On the contrary, because the turning-point has been brought about by stalemate rather than defeat, continued upheavals are inevitable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the workers\nand youth face this period of ebb \u2013 as they faced the period of revolutionary\nupsurge \u2013 without the benefit of clearly worked-out perspectives. They are\ncompelled, instead, to improvise strategy and tactics \u201con the wing\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The particularly\nintractable problem of the SA state could not have been spontaneously foreseen\nin advance by the black working class as a whole. For the nature and scale of\nthe tasks to be appreciated, the class bad to go through the experience of\nmeasuring the strength of the state in battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the point of theory and perspectives is to arm the advanced section of the class, the activists, with foresight and a scientific guide to action \u2013 to guard against both utopian expectations and unnecessary despair when the road forward seems blocked by (temporarily) insurmountable obstacles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nresponsibility to guide the movement through the revolutionary events of 1984-85\nwas, above all, with the leadership of the African National Congress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the\nhistoric consequences of the 1984-85 movement has been the open reassertion by\nthe black working class masses, on an unprecedented scale, of their allegiance\nto the banner of Congress as the organisation through which the struggle for\nnational liberation, democracy, and socialism can be carried to victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has been reflected in the sea of ANC flags that are hoisted at the funerals and demonstrations. It has been shown in the naming of all the most important mass<\/strong> organisations that have arisen openly: the Congress<\/strong> of SA Students, the regional Youth Congresses<\/strong> and now the Congress<\/strong> of SA Trade Unions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This does not reflect a passive acceptance of middle class predominance in the Congress leadership, or policies of class compromise ‘traditional’ among this leadership. On the contrary, the aim of the masses is to build on the best of the working class<\/strong> traditions created within the movement itself under the banner of Congress in the 1950s. Nevertheless, it is naturally towards the established Congress leadership that the majority of workers and youth have looked for clarity and direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In these\nconditions, the responsibility of the ANC leadership was to explain the\nprotracted character of the South African revolution, and the reasons for this,\nand put forward campaigning tasks which would mobilise and unite the whole\nmovement, and which were achievable with the forces presently at its disposal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Had the\nnecessary guidance been forthcoming from the ANC, there can be no doubt that\nthe UDF at national level would have acquired a far clearer and firmer\ndirection, despite all the arrests and bannings, and could have drawn the\nunions, youth and community organisations together in effective national action\ncampaigns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Guidance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But what\nguidance came from Lusaka?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the beginning, the exiled leaders were, by their own admission, caught by surprise by the scale and explosiveness of the struggles. Then, throughout 1985, they made call after call for the launching of an immediate lran-style insurrection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, because of\nthe present resilience of the state machine, such an insurrection was\ncompletely ruled-out at the present\nstage<\/strong> of the balance of forces in South Africa, as Inqaba<\/em> has explained (See Workers’\nRevolution or Racial Civil War<\/em>, Supplement to Inqaba<\/em> No. 16-17, May 1985).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With enormous\nself-sacrifice and heroism, the unarmed youth were already in all-out battle\nwith the state’s forces. The reckless call of the exiled ANC leadership drove\nthe youth further forward \u2013 in uncoordinated actions going beyond the force at\ntheir command. What they and the whole movement encountered was the\ninsurmountable obstacle of the armed forces of the state, without the means to\novercome it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The youth,\nfeeling all the sacrifices that had been made had not landed the movement the\nprize of the state, became increasingly frustrated. Beginning to sense the\nturning-point and the cooling of the masses, the youth looked in desperation\nfor ways to blow new life into the flames of revolt and to give the struggle a\nnew impetus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To this, as the\nebb began, the exiled ANC leadership responded by calling for \u2018taking the\nstruggle into the homes of the whites\u2019 \u2013 and into the shopping centres and\nholiday resorts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As if this was\nwhere the real power of the state could be found or successfully fought! <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As late as November,\na \u201cdiscussion article\u201d in Sechaba<\/em>,\nwas putting forward the position that (in the words of its title) \u201cThe moment\nof the revolution is now \u2013 or never in our lifetime.\u201d \u201cln the present political\nclimate at home and abroad\u201d, it stated, \u201ca month (!!) of sustained …. armed\naction may well prove to be the abracadabra<\/strong>\n(the actual word used!<\/em>) for the dawn\nof freedom in South Africa.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the youth\nlooking for a way to take an ebbing movement forward, it is difficult to\nconceive a more irresponsible perspective to put across. Freedom, needless to\nsay, will not be magically speeded-up through the spells of a sangoma, or\nrhetorical exhortations to action. It requires hard-headed and scientific\nperspectives and strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the end of\nthe year the youth themselves began to launch a serious discussion on the\nstrategy to be adopted in the schools during 1986. The advice they received\nfrom the ANC leadership was to maintain stay-away from schools permanently, in\norder to continue the head-on confrontation with the state in the streets of\nthe townships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The December\nissue (No. 4) of Congress Review<\/em>,\npublished in the Western Cape, and reflecting the official line of the\nleadership at that time, maintained that “the racist government has lost\nall political control over the entire country … it is unable to govern.”\nOnly the bourgeoisie, it continued, “insists that ‘revolution is not\naround the corner\u2019. Hence the youth must remain away from the schools on\nindefinite boycott: \u201cFreedom Now, Education Later.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Wisdom<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the youth have\nshown greater maturity and wisdom than their elders. At a conference on\nDecember 28-29, of 161 youth organisations, with 312 delegates and 300\nobservers, convened by the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee, the decision was\nreached to return to the schools as a body, placing demands on the government\nwith a three-month ultimatum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ANC\nleadership in Lusaka announced that it accepted the decision of this meeting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The return to\nschool has taken place nationally. Explaining the reasons, 137 Western Cape\norganisations released a statement which points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it is true that the apartheid state has never been as weak and open to internal and external pressure as at present, it is a disastrous illusion to believe that the government is on its knees.<\/p>

This may not be the popular thing to say, but it is the correct and responsible thing to say. There is no moral, political or educational reason for continuing the boycott of classes indefinitely.<\/p>

Indeed, to do so would be like plunging a knife into the heart of our struggle.<\/p> Reported in Weekly Mail<\/em>, 31\/1-6\/2, 1986 <\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Inqaba<\/em> supports this\nposition, and Inqaba<\/em> supporters\nplayed a role from the outset in putting it forward and gaining support for it\nwithin the movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now the youth\nwill remain determined to use the schools as centres for revolutionary\ndiscussion and organisation, and to continue the struggle against the\nauthorities \u2013 with the option of resorting to a renewed boycott when it becomes\nnecessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it is not\nonly the ANC leadership who were unable to provide the necessary centralised\nand national direction to the straggle. The leadership of the trade unions also,\non the whole, did not respond adequately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The two-day\nTransvaal general strike in November 1984 had the potential to be a springboard\nfor further and still more effective action, establishing the organised workers\ntogether with the youths as the driving force and leadership of the struggle\nagainst the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately,\nhowever, this potential was wasted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is not\nbecause the organised workers were not willing to struggle alongside the youth.\nTrade union members in their thousands have participated in many momentous\npolitical struggles in the past eighteen months. But on the whole they have not\ncarried with them the banner of the independent trade unions, or brought the\nfull power of the unions to bear within the general mass movement in the\ntownships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The unquestioned\nsuccess of the Transvaal general strike lifted the morale and confidence of the\nworking class enormously \u2013 and encouraged especially the activists both within\nand outside the trade unions. Very rapidly, the idea began to spread that it\nwas possible to repeat its success on a\nnational scale<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Every reason for such a national action existed, not only in support of the political and economic demands of the Transvaal strike, but in defence of the 6,000 Sasol workers dismissed as a result of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During 1985, on\nseveral occasions \u2013 after the Uitenhage massacre, for example, and when the\nState of Emergency was declared \u2013 the conditions and the mood for a nation-wide\nstrike recurred. But, on every occasion, the trade union leadership recoiled\nfrom it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Nation-wide<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In November\n1984, trembling at the prospect of a nation-wide repetition of the successful\nTransvaal action, the state, using its dirty tricks department, contrived to\nassociate rumours of a national strike with fake leaflets and stickers which it\ndistributed with the theme “Rape a white woman; kill a white child”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quite correctly,\nthe trade union leadership condemned these leaflets. But at the same time\nsections of the trade union leadership “disowned and denounced” (Guardian<\/em>, 28\/11\/84) rumours that a national\ngeneral strike was being planned!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No doubt there\nwas room for debate in the movement over the timing, the duration, and the\ndemands of a national general strike. But by denouncing the very idea at that\ntime, the trade union leadership missed an opportunity \u2013 at that early stage of\nthe struggle, when the movement was clearly still in its ascendancy \u2013 for the\norganised workers to place themselves firmly at the head on a nation-wide basis<\/strong> of the struggles unfolding in the townships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Not only would a\npublic demonstration of the might of the organised black workers have been important\nin strengthening the confidence of the workers themselves. The process of\norganising a national strike, if systematically undertaken, would have drawn\nthe youth close to the unions. This could have had a profound influence both in\nrevolutionising the unions’ ranks and in infusing the township struggles with greater\nproletarian discipline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Boost Strength<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Equally, the\norganised workers missed an opportunity to boost the strength of the trade\nunions themselves, through the increases in membership which would have\nresulted from a well-prepared national general strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, an\nopportunity was missed also to demonstrate, in the eyes of the whole of society\n\u2013 and of the white workers in particular \u2013 that the black workers are the most\npowerful political and social force in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This would have\nmade an important contribution towards eroding the confidence of the whites in\ntheir traditional representatives in the racist trade unions as well as the\ngovernment \u2013 a confidence already beginning to be undermined by the attacks\nwhich the economic crisis is forcing the bosses to carry out against white\nliving standards, by the dithering political policies of the government, and by\nthe open revolt of blacks against the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It would have\nhelped to prepare the ground for splitting the whites by more resolute action\nin the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Undoubtedly,\nfrom after November 1984 and on a number of occasions in 1985, there would have\nbeen a massive response to a call for a national general strike of limited duration<\/strong>. This is shown by the\nfact that in town after town, area after area, localised general strikes took\nplace: Grahamstown, Cradock, Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, Cape Town…\netc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yes, these high\npoints of action were reached at different times in different areas. But the\npoint of a nation-wide general strike, thoroughly prepared and campaigned for,\nwould have been to generalise out of the\nmultitude of local and national grievances a unified national momentum for\naction<\/strong> rather than leaving each area to take on the regime in its own time\nin isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the\narguments used by Thembinkosi Mkalipi, Fosatu chairman in the Eastern Cape, against<\/strong> support for the March 1985\nstay-away in that area, was that \u201cthe general sales tax and petrol increases were\nnational issues and required a national response”. (South African Labour Bulletin<\/em>, September 1985)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Precisely! But\nit was Fosatu which was best placed to organise \u2013 together with the UDF a\nnational response on these issues \u2013 and others \u2013 through calling a national\ngeneral strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, after\nNovember 1984, it was only in Maritzburg that the Fosatu unions took the lead\nin organising general strike action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the ranks\nof the unions the trade union leaders advanced, from November, various\nexplanations of their unwillingness to prepare a national general strike. These\narguments surfaced more openly in the Eastern Cape in March.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Trade union\nleaders argued that the unions had been “hijacked” into the November\naction by non-trade union (i.e. community and youth) organisations. They argued\nthat these organisations had no consistent membership, were not accountable to\nanybody and by implication were irresponsible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Pride<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Undoubtedly\nthese arguments gained an echo because of the justifiable pride which trade\nunion workers have in the solid organisations which they have built over the\npast decade and more. The degree of democratic control and accountability achieved\nin these unions is the envy of workers in countries with an incomparably longer\ntradition of working class organisation. That the workers should want to\njealously protect these historic gains is entirely understandable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Smokescreen<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But those who\nuse this argument about “hijacking” and “lack of\naccountability” against participation of the unions in mass actions with\nthe working class youth and township communities, are really putting up a\nsmokescreen to defend political passivity among the leadership. If trade union\nleaders gave clear political direction, and themselves \u2013 after thorough\ndemocratic discussion, yes, as far as possible throughout the unions \u2013 had initiated action<\/strong> against the\ngovernment, who could doubt the willingness of the youth and working class\ngenerally to support it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is only when\na lack of clear political leadership is manifested in the unions, that any\nquestion of political “hijacking” of the membership by other\norganisations or leaders arises. But is it “hijacking” if the pilot\nof a plane becomes paralysed and others on board take over the controls to avoid\na crash? It is a necessity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For the messes,\nincluding for the mass of union members<\/strong>,\npolitical leadership is a necessity<\/strong>\n\u2013 and if they cannot find it in and through their union organisations they will\nfind it outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was the\ncase, for example, in the Eastern Cape \u2013 where trade union members\noverwhelmingly supported the March stay-away although the trade unions refused\nto join in leading this struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Underlying the\nargument about “lack of accountability” is in fact a different\nargument \u2013 that non-trade union organisations are dominated by the middle class.\nThe same arguments were used by the same trade union leaders to oppose the\naffiliation of their trade unions to the UDF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But really, we\nhave heard enough moans and groans about the middle class! The black middle\nclass constitute a tiny minority within society. The black workers are eight to\nnine million strong; the black working class as a whole make up two-thirds of\nthe total population of South Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If there was\ndecisive political leadership forthcoming from the workers’ organisations, can\nanyone doubt that the problem of “middle class domination” in mass\npolitics could be eliminated with ease?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The trade unions\nhave come into existence against the formidable opposition of the state and of\na powerful capitalist class. By putting forward class policies \u2013 for democracy\nand socialism \u2013 in a determined way the organised workers are surely in a\nstrong enough position to assert their leadership of the movement as against\nmiddle class politicians \u2013 at the same time winning support from most middle\nclass people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Confidence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The coming into\nexistence of the trade unions over the last twelve years has given confidence\nto far wider layers of working people that they are quite capable of organising\nthemselves along democratic lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within the mass<\/strong> youth and community organisations,\nwhere they are organised thoroughly at grassroots level, there is constant\nstruggle from below to ensure accountability and control of the leadership.\nWhenever working class people rouse themselves to action and enter in force\ninto organisation, democratic methods come to the fore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is false to\ndraw an absolute distinction between trade union and community organisations in\nthis respect. Are trade unions never<\/strong>\nand to<\/strong> no degree<\/strong> manipulated from the top or dominated by petty-bourgeois\nintellectual elements? Are community organisations always<\/strong> or uniformly<\/strong>\nunder middle class leadership?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Clearly it is more difficult<\/strong> in youth and community\norganisations to establish and maintain a continuity<\/strong>\nof democratic structures and methods, in comparison with unions which have a\nmore stable<\/strong> basis in workers organised at the point of production<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But for trade\nunionists to continue to talk glibly of \u201cmiddle class domination\u201d of the youth\nand community organisations is to dismiss the enormous transformation which has\ntaken place in many local areas and even regions as a result of the revolutionary\ncharacter of the mass movement in 1984-85. Especially among the youth, the\nidentification of the class issues has increasingly become paramount.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In many local\nCongress youth organisations, middle class politicians who argue against socialism\nor who advocate a ‘two-stage’ theory are denied a platform. The essential\nworking class character of the mass community organisations has likewise come\nto the fore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

lf, particularly\nat national level, middle class leaders still exercise political influence in\nthe movement out of proportion to the mosquito weight of the middle class in\nsociety, this has little to do with \u2018sociological\u2019 differences between\ncommunity organisations and trade unions. Its\nfundamental cause is the lack of a clear alternative provided by the organised\nworking class.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, in\nreality, a position which is put forward with the ostensible aim of protecting\nthe organised workers from following the unreliable and ‘unaccountable\u2019 leadership\nof middle class politicians \u2013 has the consequence that the workers, organised\nand unorganised, are left vulnerable to such leadership, because no alternative is being offered by the workers’ organisations<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Into the vacuum\nthus created have stepped the priests. On two occasions now \u2013 it is painful to\nhave to say this \u2013 Bishop Tutu has put the trade union leaders into the shade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Mood<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sensing the mood\namong the workers for political strike action, and hoping to use it as an\nalternative to township ‘violence’ which could be diverted into ‘peace’ and\n‘prayer’, Tutu took the initiative to call unsuccessfully \u2013 for action on the\nso-called Day of Reconciliation (9 October). Now, even after Cosatu has been\nborn, Tutu has repeated the threat of strike action in support of the\neducational demands of the youth movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tutu has got no\nauthority and no ‘right’ to make these calls. But the way to deal with this is\nnot to wail about “unaccountability”, but to provide instead a fully\naccountable, clear and unequivocal political leadership through the mass\nworkers’ organisations, to the class as a whole \u2013 which the mass movement will\naccept and understand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that\nTutu’s calls have not at the present time been supported, shows that the mass\nof workers are looking to the unions for a lead. But the trade union leaders\ncannot suppose that this will necessarily always remain the case. If they do\nnot provide a lead, even Tutu cart generate support for strike action in the\nfuture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If middle class\nleaders are allowed to get away with placing themselves at the head of the\nmovement in this way, serious divisions can open up among the masses \u2013 between\nthose feeling the need to follow, and those repulsed by, leadership of this\ncharacter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Responsibilities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The trade union\nmovement cannot escape political responsibilities as the revolutionary crisis\nunfolds. But this does not mean that the forces of the organised workers should\nbe thrown full-scale into every political battle at every moment in time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As far as\npossible the ground for battle must be chosen. Preparations must be thoroughly\nmade. And, at times, the ability to call an orderly tactical retreat becomes as\nimportant a part of revolutionary leadership as to launch a bold offensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this respect\nthe experience of the NUM, in its confrontation with the Chamber of Mines in\n1985, is very useful. The NUM clearly has enormous potential power \u2013 more than\nany other single trade union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, as the\ndispute built-up, an enormous amount of expectation was generated among NUM\nactivists, trade union members generally, and the youth in particular, that\nhere was the struggle that would bring the organised workers into the forefront\nof the entire movement and deal a blow against the ruling class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the immediate\nsense, such an all-out strike could have raised the whole struggle against the\nstate to a higher plane, and rallied other forces of the movement to its\nsupport nation-wide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, an\nall-out strike by the NUM in 1985 would, most likely, have had the end result\nof setting the movement back rather than taking it forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An all-out\nconfrontation between the most powerful section of the SA working class and the\nmost powerful employer (the Chamber of Mines) \u2013 a confrontation involving the\nfate of SA’s key industry \u2013 poses a similar kind of challenge to the whole\nruling class and the state which is\nposed by an indefinite general strike<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At least to some\nextent, it puts in issue who has power to rule society. Therefore it is very\nlikely to lead to massive use of repression by the state, if it is not settled\nby compromise at a relatively early stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1985, the NUM\nitself was not yet strong enough in numbers or depth of organisation to enter willingly<\/strong> into such a battle if it could be avoided without\nsevere loss to the union in membership or morale<\/strong>. Nor, at that time, was\nthe trade union movement as a whole sufficiently united, mobilised, or prepared\nto give the necessary backing to the NUM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An all-out\nconflict would very likely have involved mass deportations of the mineworkers,\nand possibly the destruction of large parts of the NUM’s organisation. Such\nrisks have to be faced when the\nalternative is humiliating surrender without a fight<\/strong>, for there is nothing\nmore difficult for the workers’ movement to recover from than that. But all the\nfactors have to be \u2013 and had to be \u2013 soberly weighed-up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A severe defeat\nof the NUM could have set back by several years organisation on the mines\n(never easy at the best of times), and seriously affected the confidence and\nmorale of the mineworkers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than this, such<\/strong> a defeat in 1985 would have had\nbig repercussions for the whole movement. If the present ebb country-wide had\ncome about through a serious defeat, rather than through a virtual stalemate of\nforces, the ensuing reaction would have been far deeper and more severe than is\nnow proving to be the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In these\ncircumstances the tactics of the NUM leadership \u2013 of securing the maximum gains\nout of the dispute without resorting to an all-out confrontation \u2013 have in our\nview been correct overall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is so\ndespite the fact that these tactics involved acceptance of a settlement with\nAnglo-American only, so that the minority of workers on other mines struck in\nisolation and were quickly defeated, without any real possibility of mounting an\neffective solidarity strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless,\nduring the build-up of the dispute towards possible all-out action, the NUM leadership\ncould have been much more energetic on the question of encouraging the building\nof solidarity committees within the trade union movement and in the community\nat large.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An all-out mine\nstrike could only have had prospect<\/strong>\nof victory in the context of country-wide solidarity action by workers and\nyouth culminating in a national general strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To prepare the\nground for this systematically should have been a top priority of the NUM\nleadership. And in such a situation, reliance on the maximum initiative<\/strong> locally (within dear guidelines centrally laid down<\/strong>)\nshould always be encouraged, so as to mobilise the energies of the youth, the shop-floor\nactivists in other unions, and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is usually a\nmistake to attempt \u2013 as the NUM leadership did \u2013 to establish administrative\ncontrol over all solidarity efforts through a small central body. This can only\nhave the effect of stifling the local initiatives which are vital for success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In particular,\nthe huge potential of support from the Congress youth organisations, rallying\nunder the banner of the UDF, was not tapped.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Outcome<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless,\neven many activists who regarded the outcome of the dispute as a defeat at the\ntime, may now weigh up matters differently. From the point of view of the NUN,\nthe major concessions won from Anglo represented a substantial victory \u2013 outweighing,\non balance, (and for the time being) the setbacks suffered on other mines. From\nthe standpoint of the movement as a whole, the strength of this key union has\nbeen preserved for coming battles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The preservation\nof the forces of the NUM has allowed the union to play a decisive role in\nbringing Cosatu into existence \u2013 thus establishing a far stronger bastion of\nprotection for the movement in the present period of relative ebb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All these\nadvantages should now be consciously used in systematic preparation for the\nnext inevitable conflict with the mine bosses. It will not be possible to avoid\nindefinitely a large-scale baffle on the mines. Possibly even this year, the\nfull forces of the NUM will have to be launched into action \u2013 and that will\nneed the solid backing of every section of the movement to see the struggle\nthrough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Main Point<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But to return to\nthe main point: the failure of the trade union leadership as a whole to mobilise\nfor a national general strike of limited duration during the whole period of nation-wide revolt in 1984-85<\/strong> produced\ndefinite negative effects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the one hand, the state has not been made to feel the full power of even the existing strength of the working class \u2013 and has sustained an unwarranted degree of confidence because of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other\nhand, the whole movement is only too painfully aware that event after event has\nbeen allowed to pass by in which the power at the disposal of the unions was\nnot deployed in answer to the provocations of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The youth in\nparticular feel bitterly and justifiably frustrated over this. It is the reason\nwhy the potential for a disastrous and dangerous split between the youth and\nthe organised workers opened-up \u2013 to the extent that in the Eastern Cape youth\nthreatened to burn down the houses of workers who did not respond to a call to\noccupy their factories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It would be an\nabsolute disaster if the youth thought that these are the methods by which the\nproblems within the independent trade union movement can be overcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any such attacks\nby youth on workers will widen a rift that can still be healed quite easily \u2013 and\nwipe-out all the gains in worker-youth co-operation that have been achieved\nsince 1976.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

They would be a\ngift to the state, which fears a united movement led by the working class more\nthan anything else \u2013 and which would actively encourage and take advantage of\nsuch clashes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The experience\nof the role of Inkatha in Natal, and of vigilantes in many other areas must\nserve as a serious warning to the movement as to the state’s enthusiasm to sow\ndivision where it does not exist, and to intensify it where it does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the rift has\ndeveloped \u2013 and needs to be healed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the one hand\nthere is a sense among many workers that the youth have been insufficiently\nweighing-up the factors in the situation, and have a readiness to run ahead of\nthe movement \u2013 and in these feelings there is a partial truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other\nhand the youth blame the organised workers for being too slow and cautious in\nmoving into action, particularly political action and there is a truth here\ntoo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The feeling of\nfrustration at the failure to deploy the full potential political power of the\norganised working class, while strongest amongst the youth, exists also amongst\nrank-and-file trade union activists. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This frustration,\nfor example, was strongly expressed by Fosatu members when the Fosatu leadership\ncancelled the mass education workshop due to be held at the Jabulani Amphitheatre\nin Soweto on the eve of the State of Emergency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now the responsibility\nfor mobilising the political potential of the working class organised in the\ntrade unions \u2013 and for healing the breach between the trade unions and the youth\n\u2013 is thrust decisively on Cosatu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Cosatu<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1985 ended with\nthe birth of Cosatu, the biggest organisation of black workers in the history\nof the SA labour movement. This has ushered in a new era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cosatu would\nhave come into existence eventually \u2013 the objective situation was pregnant with\nit. But its birth had to be induced. That it was born at this particular time\nis attributable to the risings in the townships. In that sense the youth have acted\nas the mid-wife of Cosatu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cosatu has been\nborn as the movement is temporarily in ebb. Yet the birth could not have been\nmore timely. The whole movement has looked to Cosatu to throw its weight into\nconsolidating the existing forces of the movement, healing the breach between\nthe organised workers and the youth, and blunting the drive of the ruling class\ntowards reaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the ebb,\na decisive political initiative by Cosatu from the moment of its birth \u2013 a\nwell-prepared campaign for an achievable goal could even have turned the temporarily\ndisadvantageous position of the movement into a disadvantage for the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elijah Barayi’s\nultimatum to Botha \u2013 that if the pass laws were not abolished within six\nmonths, the passes would be burnt \u2013 provided the basis for just such a\ncampaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling class\nthemselves immediately saw the dangers. On 3 December Business Day<\/em> editorialised:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The threat of a civil disobedience campaign by Cosatu … could be serious. It wasn\u2019t too successful in the time of Albert Lutuli, but that is not to say it couldn\u2019t be better organised now.<\/p>

Quite simply, what does government do if half-a-million black people start burning their passes, especially if they are joined by many non-union members?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If, in other\nwords, it was not merely half a million, but ten million passes which were\nburnt!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To carry forward\nthis struggle, thorough preparation and campaigning would have been necessary \u2013\nand, above all, the Cosatu leadership\nneeded to name the date for the burning of the passes.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately,\nfrom the time of Barayi’s speech, there were indications that the conservatives\nin the trade unions were seeking to block this campaign. \u201cAfter a night-long\ndebate on policy\u201d reported the Cope Times (3\/12\/85),<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cosatu’s executive appeared to back-down art some of the hardline statements made on Sunday by its president, Mr Elijah Barayi. <\/p>

Mr Barayi’s call for a pass burning campaign if influx control was not scrapped in six months was clarified as ‘merely expressing the feelings and aspirations of our members’.<\/p>

Cosatu\u2019s assistant-secretary, Mr Sydney Mafumadi, said the federation had not decided on a specific deadline on the pass laws.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Shift to Left<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the whole,\nthe formation of Cosatu has represented an important weakening of the influence\nof reformism within the trade unions: leadership has shifted to the left. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet even the\nmast radical trade union leaders appear to have been cautious about plunging Cosatu\u2019s\nresources into a political campaign at this stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cyril Ramaphosa\nwas correct when he pointed out at the launching conference that, while Cosatu\nmust strive to make the politics of the working class the politics of the\nliberation movement, it must not neglect to strengthen its base in industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, taken\nforward with thorough preparation from December, a campaign based on the pass\nlaw ultimatum would have strengthened Cosatu enormously. With the main burden\nof organisation carried by the energies of the youth, acting with the authority\nof Cosatu, it could have helped to double the membership of the trade union\nmovement in the course of the campaign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Constructive<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same\ntime, through this campaign, the energies of the youth, straining at the leash,\nmany tempted to engage in adventures, could have been channelled into\nconstructive political activity which would strengthen their bonds with the\nworkers and set their sights on a realistically achievable goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When comrade\nBarayi’s initiative was not taken forward by the whole Cosatu leadership, the\nruling class undoubtedly heaved a sigh of relief \u2013 and the reaction gained encouragement\nfrom what was taken as a sign of weakness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was after the\ntrade unions failed to give active leadership to the Eastern Cape general\nstrike last March that striking mineworkers were dismissed en masse<\/em> at Vaal Reefs. In the same way, the political hesitation\nof the Cosatu leadership coincided with Gencor’s mass dismissals at lmpala\nplatinum mine in Bophuthatswana. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Without\nindustrial strength, the political potential of the trade unions is weakened.\nBut equally, unless the trade union movement deploys its political muscle, the\nruling class grows bolder on the industrial front as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover,\nJanuary saw the biggest death-toll since the revolutionary upsurge began \u2013 mostly\nthrough the reactionary activities of Bantustan thugs and township vigilantes,\ngrown bolder because of the loss of initiative by the movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Buthelezi too,\ntook confidence from the situation to go onto the offensive against Cosatu in\nNatal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, the\nregime has not felt confident enough to rest exclusively on repression and\nreaction. Botha’s “Rubicon II” speech at the end of January, while\nhopelessly trapped within the framework of maintaining white domination,\nnevertheless in its tone signalled a renewed search for a “path of\nreform”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of its most\nsignificant features was the position on the pass laws, in the full-page\nadvertisements which followed it. Botha stated “Well, I can tell you the\npass system will be scrapped by 1 July this year.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Undoubtedly, the\noverwhelming reaction among the masses to this statement is “But with what\nnew scheme for controlling movement and enforcing divisions are you intending\nto try and replace it?” Influx control has been, for generations, a\ncentral mechanism of the capitalist class for enforcing cheap labour \u2013 and a document carried by black workers,\nwhatever it is called, is indispensable to enforce influx control.<\/strong> The\nruling class will not give up this mechanism lightly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, can it be denied that it is unprecedented for the regime to define a date so precisely for one of its “reforms”, even before carrying through the necessary legislation?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Would Botha have\nneeded to do this, had it not been for the ultimatum issued by Elijah Barayi,\nand the echo which the regime’s intelligence network undoubtedly detected that\nthis ultimatum was gaining among the rank-and-file of Cosatu?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the weeks\nbefore Botha\u2019s speech, there was growing support among trade union and youth\nactivists in several regions for the naming\nof a date<\/strong> for pass-burning, as advocated in Inqaba’s<\/em> 2 December editorial statement. Unfortunately, the Cosatu\nleadership has not acted swiftly to back-up comrade Barayi’s ultimatum with a definite<\/strong> challenge to Botha in this\nway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Botha has attempted\nto steal back from the Cosatu leadership the initiative for scrapping the\n\u2018dompas\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As if to\nunderline this, the Financial Mail<\/em>\n(7\/2\/86) wrote:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Government has announced that SA’s pass laws are to be scrapped by 1 July.<\/p>

Whether President Botha’s commitment will pre-empt a Congress of SA Trade Unions threat to launch a mass burning of the dompas in time remains to be seen.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The tone of \u201cRubicon II\u201d, the new discussions regarding the release of Mandela, and this statement on the pass laws, all reveal that \u2013 despite the immense force at the disposal of the state and the temporary ebbing of the movement \u2013 there has not been a decisive shift<\/strong> in the underlying balance of forces against the working class. The ruling class feels vulnerable and lacks confidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it is not\nenough for the leadership of the movement merely to rest on this underlying\nbalance of forces. In contrast to the situation that would have obtained had Cosatu\nfrom December<\/strong> been engaged in\nmobilisation on the question of the passes, Botha can even gain some temporary\ncredit among the unorganised mass of\nworkers<\/strong> if he carries out the abolition of the present pass laws and\nexempts many Africans from any new system of influx control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet what will\nstill be preoccupying the masses is the question “what does the regime\nintend after 1 July as regards influx control?”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Influx Control<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even now, the\ninitiative can be recovered. As General Secretary Naidoo said following the\nFebruary Cosatu CEC, Botha\u2019s “announcement of a uniform ID document for\nall races did not change the fact that black people’s movements would still be\nrestricted \u2013 influx control had been institutionalised through the homeland\nsystem and the system of labour bureaux for recruiting workers. ‘Pass laws,\ninflux control and other apartheid laws are all interlinked’.” (City Press<\/em>, 16\/2\/85) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Botha \u2013 a\nstatement of the CEC added \u2013 “cannot be entrusted with the task of\ndismantling a system of national oppression and economic exploitation.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Comrade Naidoo\nwent on to promise that “A specific anti-pass law program of action is to\nbe devised by the executive soon.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Botha’s 1 July deadline\ncould, for example, be turned against him, if Cosatu together with the UDF,\ndeclares that on that date all passes will burn \u2013 and, with that, calls a one\nor two-day national strike to declare that influx control is dead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The purpose\nwould be to demonstrate that the oppressed will accept no alternative measures\nwhich restrict freedom of movement in the country, including from the Bantustans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This would\nrequire the mobilisation of the youth and workers to begin campaigning as soon\nas possible, preparing for the event by means of mass explanation and\norganisation, building the unions and consolidating the community\norganisations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the longer\nthat there is delay in setting a date and publicising details of the campaign,\nthe more difficult it will be to recover and build the necessary momentum.\nEvery day is precious now if such a campaign is to be a full-blooded success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Power<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the\nimmense power the trade unions can wield in the political struggle, they are\nnot, as trade unions<\/strong>, equipped to\nlead the political struggle as a whole \u2013 to prepare the working class and all\nthe oppressed for the conquest of state power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To wage the\npolitical battle against the state, to unite the whole movement around revolutionary\npolicies, the working class needs to build mass political organisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, it is\nonly through revolutionary workers’ political organisation within the trade\nunions that they can be consistently defended as instruments of the working class\nagainst the bosses and the regime \u2013 and the conservative influence of\nreformists among the trade union leaders combatted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Inqaba<\/em> has explained in previous\nmaterial, this political organisation will not come about on the basis of simply\ndeclaring a \u201cworkers’ party\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More than ever before, the experience of the last eighteen months has reaffirmed that, as the masses move into revolutionary struggle, it is towards the ANC that they turn to carry to victory the struggle for democracy and socialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Because the black\nworkers and youth are rallying to build the ANC as their own revolutionary<\/strong> organisation, the\n‘liberal’ bourgeoisie and its agents have rushed to have consultations with the\nANC leadership in exile, hoping to ensnare them into some compromise \u201cresolution\u201d\nof South Africa’s political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ‘liberal’ SA\nmining bosses are the most calculating section of the ruling class. It was the\nneeds of their industry which laid the basis for apartheid and the cheap labour\nmachinery which the state protects now on behalf of the capitalist class as a\nwhole. Their hands are dripping with the blood not only of the black workers of\nSouth Africa, but of the whole of Southern Africa, including Kaunda’s Zambia\nwhere they held their talks with the ANC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Less than\neighteen months ago, legally striking mineworkers were killed and maimed by police\ncalled in to Anglo mines. Just months before the \u2018talks\u2019 Anglo sacked 14,000\nmineworkers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To a man, they,\nand every spokesman of the capitalist class, have declared their implacable opposition\nto any political “solution” in South Africa based on one-person-one-vote\nin an undivided country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ruling class\nknows full well that, for the working masses, the struggle for national\nliberation is a struggle for the power with which to end poverty wages,\njoblessness, homelessness, and so on \u2013 in short, to implement the Freedom\nCharter as a living reality. This, they will strive to prevent with all the\nmeans at their disposal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recently, a\npublication of the so-called “liberal” capitalists \u2013 the Financial Mail<\/em> (6\/12\/85) made their\nposition quite clear on this question. It pointed out that\n“interventionist military action in a last-ditch attempt to retain the\nstatus quo … has not been totally discounted in some quarters.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the present\ntime, of course, this is not what the decisive sections of the ruling class\nwant. The monopoly bosses, presenting themselves as liberals, seek to distance\nthemselves from the repression of Botha’s regime in the hope that through\n“reforms” that accommodate “moderate” black leaders, they\ncan hold off the revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless,\nthe Financial Mail<\/em> concluded,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just which would be the worst-case scenario \u2013 a dictatorship of the Left or one of the Right \u2013 is open to conjecture. Few, however, who have any insight into the ideological drift of the African National Congress Freedom Charter and its talk of nationalisation have any serious doubts on that score. Anything would be preferable to seeing SA’s economy decimated by such crude attempts at ‘wealth redistribution’ implicit in the doctrine of the Charter.<\/strong> [Our emphasis.]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Faced in the\nfuture with an increasingly powerful movement of the working class struggling\nunder the banner of the ANC for the demands of the Freedom Charter, the ruling\nclass have already declared that, rather than give in, they will opt for\n“a dictatorship of the extreme Right” \u2013 by which they mean something\nfar more ferocious and reactionary even than the current regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The present\nstate machine is the only and final defence of their welth, power and ownership\nof industry, and they depend utterly upon it. They are clear that they will\nnever entrust its government to the African National Congress supported by the\nfull-weight of the revolutionary proletarian masses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is clear that\na “negotiated solution” to the movement’s demands for democracy \u2013 however\nmuch it may be sought after \u2013 is ruled-out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the\ncapitalists don their liberal mombakkies and fly to Lusaka to shake hands with\nthe ANC leaders \u2013 it is not in order to discuss how they can make a\ncontribution to the Freedom Charter by handing over their wealth to the people.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the contrary,\nit is out of their terror of the hostility to capitalism that exists in the\nmovement \u2013 where the slogan that “big business and the state are two sides\nof the same bloody coin” has become a commonplace and out of their hopes\nthat the ANC leaders will assuage these fears by entering political compromises\non the basis of capitalist interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among activists\nin the country, the manoeuvres of the bosses are increasingly transparent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Profits<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Big\nbusiness”, states Saspu National<\/em>\n(October\/November 1985) “is worried that worker, youth and township action\nmay threaten capitalism itself. If there was no resistance … affecting their\nprofits, they would not be clamouring at PW’s door for action. Nor would they\nsee much point in meeting the ANC”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even a priest,\nFather Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, a patron of the UDF, is clear on the businessmen’s\nmotives: \u201cThey want to create a healthy climate for profit-making. They are not\nreally against apartheid. But they realise the township unrest is against their\ninterests.” (Weekly Mail<\/em>,\n13-19\/9\/85)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The experience\nof the last eighteen months has confirmed in the eyes of wider and wider layers\nof working people, that the burdens loaded upon them cannot be removed unless\nthe apartheid regime is destroyed root-and-branch \u2013 through a struggle to the\nend against the capitalist class whose wealth and power that state defends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Workers’ Power<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The way forward\nto this is through the mobilisation of the masses led by the organised working\nclass around perspectives, programme and strategy of uncompromising struggle\nfor workers’ power<\/strong> \u2013 to dismantle\nthe state and replace it by the democratic rule of the working class, and to\ntake the big monopolies out of the hands of the capitalist class and bring them\nunder democratic workers’ control and management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ANC\nleadership is called upon to show the way forward in this struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But while on the\none hand, throughout 1985, the exiled leadership has been issuing absurd exhortations\nfor the carrying through of an immediate insurrection \u2013 on the other hand they\nhave been prepared to talk with the big businessmen, and other spokesmen of the\ncapitalist class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It has been\ndisturbing to read that the businessmen, while not crowing about the outcome of\nthe talks, certainly did not emerge from them as unhappy men with an ill\nforeboding about the future of their system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tony Bloom,\nChairman of Premier group, and a member of the delegation, wrote in the Financial Mail<\/em> (11\/10\/85):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I was surprised (almost overwhelmed) by the cordiality of the meeting \u2026 I sometimes worry that we got on a little bit too well!…<\/p>

Clearly there are fixed positions on either side that are diametrically opposed to each other, but this is the position in many negotiations. I believe that there could be room for compromise and I would unhesitatingly support any initiative to get the SA government and the ANC into contact with each other.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What do the ANC\nleadership regard as the justification for these talks? On their own account,\nthey have not been very forthcoming on this question. However a recent article\nby Howard Barrel in Work in Progress<\/em>,\nNo. 39 (October 1985), written on the basis of extensive and sympathetic\npresentation of \u2018ANC sources\u2019, claims that “there are several relatively\nconstant over-riding principles guiding the movement’s tactics on the question\nof talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among these, he\nmaintains, are \u201cthe need to build maximum unity between all sections and\nformations of the oppressed, other democrats and progressives\u201d; \u201cto win over to\nits basic outlook as many potentially amenable whites a possible\u201d; \u201cat least to\nattempt to neutralise some hitherto reactionary elements, and thereby as much\nas possible to isolate politically the die-hard defenders of what it sees as a\nracist and exploitative state power\u201d; to “weaken the ranks of the\n‘generalised enemy’\u201d;  to “engage in\ntalks which may offer a reasonable prospect of reducing the extent of people’s\nsuffering in achieving state power”; to encourage “a new legal\nclimate” which \u201cmay enable a number of other progressive and democratic\nformations to hold similar talks\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maximum unity\naround the goals of our movement, and the reduction of the suffering of the\npeople, are important tasks. But they\nwill not be carried forward by these talks.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In reality, by\nengaging in these talks, the leadership is creating illusions in the possibility\nof a negotiated settlement \u2013 even in the prospect of a transfer of power to an\nANC government on this basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Surely the task of the leadership is to use every opportunity to bring it home to the masses that liberation will not be brought to them through negotiations or by any other class except the working class \u2013 and that this requires the mobilisation of millions into a conscious revolutionary struggle for power.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The task is to\nmercilessly expose the fraudulence of the \u201cprogressive\u201d and \u201cdemocratic\u201d claims\nof big business; to point out that the regime has been shaken but is far from\nbeing overthrown, and to put forward a programme of action with uncompromising\ndemocratic and socialist aims as the basis for mobilising the millions of black\nworkers and preparing for the armed seizure of power by the organised working\nclass.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Only the organisation of such a struggle \u2013 by confronting all supporters of the state power with an implacably determined and organised alternative power<\/strong> \u2013 can “weaken the ranks of the generalised enemy”, “isolate politically the die-hard defenders of the regime”, win over “as many potentially amenable whites as possible”, “build maximum unity between all sections and formations of the oppressed”, and “offer a reasonable prospect of reducing the extent of people’s suffering”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To defeat and\ndismantle the apartheid state of the bosses it will be necessary not only for\nthe oppressed to become mobilised, organised, and armed under the leadership of\nthe working class, but for this movement to remove from the ruling class the support that they enjoy among the\nworking class and lower middle class whites who provide the regime with its\nsocial base, and who, as the active arm of the state machine, are the source of\nits continued strength<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An attitude of vacillation, temporising, or compromise with the capitalist class not only serves to disarm the movement of the black majority \u2013 but will have a profoundly negative effect on the consciousness of the white workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

White Workers<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The effects of\ncapitalist crisis, and the challenge of the black working class to white\ndomination, are awakening the white workers and lower middle class out of the\nlong slumber they have enjoyed in their privilege. Most, blaming the government\nfor \u2018betraying them to the liberal capitalists\u2019, will initially move further to\nthe right, as is plainly already taking place. They will try to find a way out\nby going further<\/strong> down the blind\nalley of racist frenzy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, no more\nthan the present regime or the “progressive” businessmen, can\nTreurnicht or Marais or Terreblanche or even a military dictatorship, restore\nthe living standards of the whites, or guarantee their political privileges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the advance\nof the revolution, with degeneration of the SA situation into chaos and horror\nseemingly without end, the whites will look more and more desperately for some\nsolution \u2013 for some real alternative. If they do not rind it in the forces of\nthe revolution, they will cling more and more desperately to reaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The least\nappealing alternative for the whites is the prospect of a toenadering between\nthe big capitalists and the leaders of the black masses; of being “sold\nout” by secret deals. The ranks of the whites will not be persuaded to\nbelieve that out of such negotiations, any agreement can be arrived at which\noffers them a future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rather than\nundermining the support amongst the white workers for the extreme right, such negotiations\nwill increase it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the white\nworkers and middle class are left in the clutches of the ultra-right reaction,\nit is the prospect of a bloody racial civil war which would be increased.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The task is to\nconvert a struggle which will inevitably all along have elements of a racial\ncivil war into a class war led by the\nworking class against the capitalist class and all its supporters<\/strong>. A key to\nthis will be the firm pursuit of non-racial class policies by the powerful\nmovement of the black working class majority towards their lost white working class\nbrothers and sisters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is the\nbest, and in the end the only, guarantee for weakening and isolating the enemy\nand thus reducing the peoples’ suffering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Armed Struggle<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Never before has\nthe demand of the youth and workers for arms been so urgent as in the\ninsurrectionary struggles of 1984-85.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Tembisa, at\nthe beginning of the year, youth were chanting “Mkhonto we Sizwe! Mkhonto\nwe Sizwe! We are waiting for you! We are unarmed!” ln Queenstown, at the\nend of the year, Congress youth donned military-style uniforms, and marched in\nformation carrying AK47s carved out of wood and plastic!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The need for\n‘armed struggle’ has been proclaimed by the ANC leadership for the past twenty-five\nyears: MK was formed in 1961. Yet, at the same time as calling for an immediate\ninsurrection in 1985, ANC broadcasts on Radio Freedom made it plain that the\nmovement could not look to the organisation for the necessary arms. Clearly no\nserious preparations for arming an insurrection had been made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In reality as we\nhave discussed previously, calls for immediate all-out insurrection to\noverthrow the state were ridiculously premature and adventurist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But what has been\nnecessary at this stage is to organise and develop the capacity of the youth\nand workers, fighting on the township streets, to defend themselves more effectively against troops and police and\ndeliver, from a defensive position, punishing armed blows against their\nattackers<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Once again,\nhowever, as in 1976, when the need for armed self-defence arose against the\nmurderous forces of the state, neither the arms nor the practical policies for\ndoing this have been forthcoming from the underground leadership. This is\ndespite a debate within the ranks of the ANC in exile \u2013 reflected in articles\nin Sechaba<\/em> and the African Communist<\/em> \u2013 on the question of\narming the masses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At root, the\nparalysis of the leadership stems from uncertainty over a fundamental political\nquestion: whether ‘armed struggle’ is to be seen as a means of ‘pressurising’\nthe ruling class towards a ‘negotiated settlement’ (a utopian conception which\nleads, in practice, to holding back the arming of the revolutionary mass\nmovement); or whether the course should be set firmly towards organising and\npreparing the forces, consciousness and material means necessary for an armed\nconquest of power by the black working people in future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the question\nof armed struggle, as on every other question, our movement needs to take as\nits guideline the principle: what\ndevelops the self-confidence and consciousness of the working class in its own\npower to confront and defeat the vicious apartheid regime and the bosses\nthrough an eventual mass armed insurrection.<\/strong> For only by these means can\nnational liberation and democracy be secured, and the road opened to the\nsocialist transformation of society. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Inqaba<\/em> has consistently explained, the\nANC leadership has failed to adopt a working\nclass<\/strong> approach to the question of armed struggle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the talk\nof “Iran-style insurrection” and “people\u2019s war”, the\nleadership have, over 25 years, based their conception of ‘armed struggle’ on\nthe methods of guerillaism: the activities of small armed groups, detached from\nthe mass organisations, and operating independently of the rhythm of the\nmovement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the armed\nconfrontations which have taken place in the townships in 1984-85, guerrilla tactics<\/strong> by youth and workers have had\nan essential role to play. Small groups in particular areas, organising to\nengage in hit-and-run battles with the police and troops, are necessary\nparticularly at the early stages of any mass insurrectionary movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, a guerrilla\nstrategy<\/strong> is based on the wrong idea\nthat, when it comes to challenging the power of the state, a guerrilla \u2018army\u2019 \u2013\nsuch as MK \u2013 can substitute<\/strong> itself for\nthe power (eventually, the fully armed power) of the mass movement of the\nworking class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Industrialisation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In South African\nconditions \u2013 with a high level of industrialisation, and a peasantry virtually\neliminated \u2013 a guerrilla war<\/strong> has no\nprospect of winning state power. To the extent that illusions have been created\nin the ability of guerrilla forces to substitute themselves for the power of\nthe working class in confronting the state, they stand in the way of the\nworking class identifying and preparing to take on the tasks which it alone can\ncarry to victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In periods of\nforward movement, such as the revolutionary upsurge of 1984-85 \u2013 and, indeed,\nthe whole period since about 1980 \u2013 this is not so apparent. In fact, during\n1984-85 actions by MK have been dwarfed by the spontaneous battles conducted by\nthe masses themselves, and in particular the youth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But in phases of\nrelative ebb, such as we have now entered, it is the danger of fostering illusions\n\u2013 and further dangers too \u2013 which are opened-up by the pursuit of a guerrilla\nstrategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In such\nconditions, sabotage, bombings, etc. have a heightened, and sometimes even a\nbriefly spectacular, visibility. Because the masses no longer have the same\nsense of power as in the period of advance, such actions can win applause as\n“at least a blow against the state”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Pretext<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the\nstate uses the occurrence of these actions as a pretext for stepping up\nrepression, not merely against “terrorists”, but against all the organs\nof the mass movement \u2013 and as propaganda for hardening the support of whites\nfor the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is essential\nto see that armed struggle conducted by formations of the mass movement<\/strong> \u2013 including guerrilla tactics by groups of\nyouth and workers on a wide-scale during a phase of general advance \u2013 has an\nentirely different effect politically<\/strong>\nthan military actions concluded by a few guerrilla detachments operating\nindependently of the mass movement, especially in a phase of ebb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unfortunately,\nsuch debate on the strategy of armed struggle as has taken place among the ANC\nleadership in exile in the course of 1985 has not involved any fundamental reappraisal\nof approach, but merely on how far the range of guerrilla targets should be\nextended to so-called “soft targets”, including white civilians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has\ncoincided with the bombings in Natal, and landmine explosions on the borders,\nin which even small children of whites have been killed. To say that many black\nchildren have died, and that whites should also be made to suffer for\napartheid, is to miss the essential political point as far as revolution is\nconcerned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

White armed power is the basis of the SA state. To defeat the state, that white armed power will need to be defeated. There is no other road to that except by raising the movement of the black working class, and all the oppressed, to its full revolutionary strength and consciousness.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the coming\nwaves of revolutionary upsurge support for the ruling class can be stripped\naway only through a combination of clear working class policies for democracy\nand socialism \u2013 and the emergence of an unconquerable revolutionary force\ncapable of defending itself with arms against the state and white reaction and\nmoving from there towards the conquest of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lessons of\nhow to engage in armed struggle against the state have had to be learned\nvirtually from scratch by the youth \u2013 with enormous ingenuity and resourcefulness\n\u2013 first in 1976, but above all in the uprisings of the last eighteen months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This experience\nis a precious resource for the future \u2013 and will need to be developed in a\nscientific way through assimilating the history of insurrectionary experience\nof the whole international working class movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With these\nlessons properly digested and applied, the movement can be better equipped even\nin the next insurrectionary wave for armed defence against the death-squads,\nthe police and the army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This in turn,\nwill steel and prepare ever wider layers for conducting the future mass armed\ninsurrection to overthrow the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Armed struggle,\nhowever, is only the continuation of the political struggle by other means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nine-tenths of\nthe necessary preparation for the armed defence of the movement, and for the\ninsurrection, consists in building the mass movement under the leadership of\nthe working class around scientific perspectives and clear political policies\nfor democracy and socialism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The South\nAfrican revolution will be protracted, bitter, and bloody. But, alter the\nstruggles of 1984-85, who can doubt that the revolution has begun?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It will be\ncarried to victory by the heroism of the youth and the uncompromising\ndetermination of the whole black working class, building mass trade unions and\na mass ANC on a socialist programme, through absorbing and developing the\ntime-tested revolutionary methods of Marxism, the international inheritance of\nthe working class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Transcribed from the original by the Marxist Workers Party (2019).<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Originally appeared in Inqaba Ya Basebenzi No. 18-19 (February 1986) under the pen name Basil Hendrickse by Weizmann Hamilton In the preface to his masterly […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1050,"parent":2789,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1049","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"aioseo_notices":[],"acf":[],"_hostinger_reach_plugin_has_subscription_block":false,"_hostinger_reach_plugin_is_elementor":false,"brizy_media":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1049","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1049"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1049\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1288,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1049\/revisions\/1288"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2789"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1050"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marxistworkersparty.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1049"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}